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ABSTRACT
MASKS: MAINTAINING ANONYMITY BY SEQUESTERING KEY
STATISTICS
James Michael Alexander
Jonathan Smith
High-resolution digital cameras are becoming ever-larger parts of our daily lives,
whether as part of closed-circuit surveillance systems or as part of portable digital
devices that many of us carry around with us. Combining the broadening reach of
these cameras with automatic face recognition technology creates a sensor network
that is ripe for abuse: our every action could be recorded and tagged with our
identities, the date, and our location as if we each had an investigator tasked only
with keeping each of us under constant surveillance. Adding the continually falling
cost of data storage to this mix, and we are left with a situation where the privacy
abuses don’t need to happen today: the stored imagery can be mined and re-mined
forever, while the sophistication of automatic analysis continues to grow.
The MASKS project takes the first steps toward addressing this problem. If we
would like to be able to de-identify faces before the images are shared with others, we
cannot do so with ad hoc techniques applied identically to all faces. Since each face is
unique, the method of disguising that face must be equally unique. In order to hide
or reduce those critical identifying characteristics, we are delivering the following
foundational contributions toward characterizing the nature of facial information:
• We have created a new pose-controlled, high-resolution database of facial images.
• The most prominent anatomical markers on each face have been marked for
position and shape, establishing a new gold standard for facial segmentation.
• A parameterized model of the diversity of our subject population was built
based on statistical analysis of the annotations. The model was validated by
comparison with the performance of a standard set of artificial disguises.
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Chapter 1
Motivation and Groundwork
1.1

Good Tools Gone Bad

When discussing video surveillance in public places, the high density of closed-circuit
video surveillance cameras currently in use in the United Kingdom is frequently
cited. The exact numbers are subject to some debate, but have been conservatively
estimated in the millions [58], with hundreds of thousands of lenses trained on the
London area alone. Less controversial than the most up-to-date size of the surveillance network is that, at least in urban areas, the use of camera networks is on the
rise[13, 72, 53, 55, 19, 78, 7, 92, 80].
Parallel to the growth of fixed surveillance camera networks is the frequency
of the inclusion of cameras that increasingly many people carry around on their
person. Whether purpose-built for capturing images, or as a component of another
device, e.g. a laptop, PDA, or cellular phone, many of these devices also include a
GPS feature, enabling precise and automatic annotation of the time and location as
part of the recorded image. Wireless networking features allow these images to be
transmitted quickly and easily anywhere in the world. All of these devices become
more and more capable as prices fall.
At the same time as cameras and other sensory devices move toward ubiquity in
1

our public life, the cost of data storage continues to fall. As a consequence, when
the decision is made on whether or not to dispose of image data, storage cost is
often not a primary cost driver. When it takes human intervention to do it, the cost
of separating the wheat from the chaff over a collection of stored video can exceed
the cost of simply keeping everything. If it is not being destroyed, this means that
even if not much is being done with this imagery today, a decision to do nothing
with it might not hold forever. If there is no cost reason favoring disposal of the
data, then it might be mined for information at any point in the future. Ever
more sophisticated techniques are being developed for processing and automatically
extracting information from the raw data. This includes categorization of objects,
recognition of activities, identification of individuals, as well as combinations of all
of these. Data that is not worth sifting through today will not stay that way forever:
advances in image processing will mean that nobody has to do this work manually.
A compelling argument can be made that getting caught on camera in a public
place should not be considered any sort of violation of personal privacy: after all,
since it is a public place, anyone who happens to be nearby will be able to observe
your activities. In the former case, you are being observed by chance passers-by,
who if they do not know you and your activities are ordinary, are unlikely to be
interested in paying much attention to you. This situation offers what has been
called the anonymity of the crowd.
When one combines the cameras with indefinite storage and automatic information extraction, however, we claim that the situation is very different. This latter
situation is much closer by being followed by an investigator who is keenly interested
in what you, in particular, are doing, and he is taking meticulous notes. This investigator might already know a lot about who you are, knows when your activities
are out of the ordinary, and has perfect recall about everything you do wherever he
can see you. The key to this difference is identification: without a known identity
to attach the observed actions to, the investigator has nothing of value, whether the
2

investigator is a human or a machine.
It is not merely embarrassment that is at risk with such a tremendous loss of
privacy. Most people have details about their lives that, taken out of context, could
cost them an new job, a loan, or an insurance policy. Losing the ability to be
anonymous can even be life-threatening in some situations. Clandestine agents,
undercover police officers, or people under the protection of the Federal Witness
Security program might, at any time, have their identities suddenly revealed. Their
adversaries need only think to try combining an image search engine and off-the-shelf
face recognition software.
This confluence of information technologies, like many tools, has great benefits as
well as great potential for misuse. We believe that information technology can also
supply the basis for countermeasures to the inevitable abuses. In this dissertation,
we endeavor to lay a strong foundation for reaching this goal.

1.2

A Data-Driven Strategy

At a very high level, the problem of interfering with successful identification of a
person from an image can be characterized as a matter of jamming a communication
channel. An individual has information sufficient to identify her encoded as the
shapes and textures of her face. The information is transmitted as light reflected
from the surfaces of her face. Her adversary wants the ability to match any captured
instance of this light, an image, to a previously-built model of her specific appearance.
She, on the other hand, wishes to interfere with the transmission, depriving her
adversary of as much accurate information as she can manage.
The optimal strategy, of course, is to deprive the adversary of all information by
never exposing her face to a sensing device. This requires either never being seen in
public or wearing a mask that conceals the entire face at all times. There are some
cultures where traditional dress accommodates the latter case, but in many Western
3

countries, dressing with the face concealed is not at all the norm. Let us assume,
then, that we wish to at least make our adversary’s life a little more difficult by
depriving him of some information. How should she decide which part of her face
to hide if not all of it? The best strategy would be to hide the parts that are most
informative; how do we know what those are?
The answer, of course, is that it depends what she looks like. Since we believe
the appearance of the face to be a valid biometric identifier, that necessarily assumes
that each person’s appearance is unique. From this assumption, we can immediately
conclude that the best partial disguise for her face will need to be customized: the
disguise needs to be as unique as her face. This brings us to our first hypothesis.
Hypothesis 1.1 The overall distinctiveness of each human face can be divided into
features, each of which have their own distinctiveness contributing to a overall unique
appearance.
We do not claim that any feature set we choose to study is unique, nor that we
can parameterize facial structures in such a way that the statistical distribution of
any one feature is independent of the others. In fact, we believe that the negative of
each of these properties holds.
This also brings us to the first major hurdle, and major contribution, that arose
from the our project: Maintaining Anonymity by Sequestering Key Statistics, hereafter referred to as the MASKS project. We needed a set of annotated facial images
to work with. That is, we needed a set of images for which a suitable feature set had
been chosen, and had been marked up using the parameters of those features.
The particular feature set that we are choosing to analyze in the first pass through
the MASKS project data is geometrical in nature. That is, we are interested in size
and shape rather than other properties such as texture or color. We are furthermore
taking a bottom-up approach: we break down the geometry we wish to compare
into the atoms of which they are composed: distances and angles delimited by corresponding sets of carefully chosen points. We chose a geometric analysis as our
4

starting point because we think it is the easiest information for a face recognition
system to extract reliably, even from relatively inferior photography. By contrast,
reliable color information requires a controlled light source (or at least information
about the color of the light), and textural information diminishes rapidly with the
sampling resolution. Furthermore, since the geometrical features we will study are
largely delimited by bone and muscle structures, they are among the most challenging aspects of a face to disguise, so we felt that it was important to attack what we
think is the hardest part of the problem first.
There have certainly been other efforts toward taking such measurements of human faces, but as we will discuss further in chapter 3, prior efforts have either not
been sufficient in number for meaningful statistical analysis, or the feature set has
been based on anatomical structures that must be located by touch, so are impractical for an effort based on photographs. We are aware of no effort prior to the
MASKS project to produce a gold-standard set of annotated facial images.
As we will also see in chapter 3, since the set of features that we wanted to work
with are geometrical in nature, in order to compare geometrical features of pairs
of faces, we needed the perspectives of the photographs to be controlled, or else
the details of the pose needed to be recorded so that perspective corrections could
be done in post-processing. Additionally, we needed more than one similarly-posed
image for each subject so that we would have separate training and test image sets
to work with for use with our face recognition engines. Again, we looked for and
failed to find an existing image set with the desired properties, so it was necessary
to create our own. The details of this effort are fully described in chapter 2.
Returning to the feature annotations themselves, as we will fully develop in chapter 3, the features that we chose to work with are simply the boundaries of the most
prominent facial features as other humans typically parse and understand them: the
eyes, nose, mouth, and the edges of the head itself. Since we are going through
this effort in order to understand how to interfere with the operation of machines, it
5

Figure 1.1: A visualization of the kinds of features extracted during a typical eigenfaces training process. Image used with the kind permission of Christopher DeCoro,
Princeton University Computer Graphics Lab.

makes sense to ask why not work with the same features that the machines use? In
answer to this, consider figure 1.1. Each of the small images in this set represent one
feature produced in training of a face recognition engine using a variant of the eigenfaces algorithm [140]. A face recognition system based on eigenfaces represents each
face it is trained to recognize as a linear combination of these features. Eigenfaces
is a member of a class of unsupervised machine learning algorithms, in which structure is discovered in a set of data using only unlabeled examples. Many successful
published face recognition techniques are based on unsupervised or semi-supervised
methods. The performance of these techniques continues to stand the test of time,
but these feature sets are hard, if not impossible, for human beings to make sense
of. For instance, if we find in the course of analysis that, for one of our subjects, the
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feature shown in the first position of the second row is particularly weighty, it is not
at all clear what that means for disguising that subject1 .
How, then, do we know that working with our more human-understandable features will be effective at interfering with automatic face recognition systems that
employ totally different features. This is our second hypothesis.
Hypothesis 1.2 The facial structures most prominent to untrained human observation are critical to recognition regardless of the target recognizer’s model.
That is, we claim that although the features we are using are different, they cannot possibly be completely unrelated to those extracted by machine learning means.
After all, the core features that we are using for this project are drawn from the regions of highest contrast in a photograph of a face, and it is inconceivable to us that
a face recognition system with anything like respectable performance could afford
to ignore such low-hanging fruit. Another way of looking at this is while any given
system might not have a model that specifically separates out a representation of,
say, the nose, we find it exceedingly unlikely that it will have a model that ignores
the nose entirely.
We can also point to the ability for humans to recognize caricatures [114] of
one another: a simple line drawing can sometimes more readily recognizable as the
person it depicts than a genuine photograph of the same person. Exaggerating the
distinctive elements of the core structures tends to enhance recognition even though
this exaggeration deviates from reality. This is not to say that we claim whatever
feature set we study will come anywhere near exhaustively modeling the diversity of
human facial variation. Rather we believe that there exists a relatively small feature
set that is sufficient to support recognition.
1

If the goal is to improve the performance of a given face recognition system, it is also problematic
to see how to make incremental improvements. If a particular face is consistently not recognized
by the system, one reasonable supposition is that she has distinctive features that are not captured
by the current feature set. If the features look like eigenfaces, it is hard to intuit what might be
left out.
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We created the MASKS data set for our immediate research needs as well as
those of the broader research community. While we are gratified to be able to fill
an obvious void in furthering our understanding of faces as biometrics, we don’t
believe that this is the most important contribution of the MASKS project. As
much as we would like to say, with the publication of this dissertation, that we
have definitively solved the privacy problem we elucidated in the first section of
this chapter, we cannot make that claim for present camera and face recognition
technologies, much less for innovations still to come. Indeed, we can only claim to
have built a foundation on which such a solution might someday be built. We expect
that there will be something of a continual tug-of-war between biometric measure
and countermeasure, much like the adversarial relationship of cryptographer and
cryptanalyst. It is therefore vital that our annotation work is done according to
principles that we lay out in chapter 3. We recognize that face recognition technology
is a moving target, and we therefore must design our countermeasure enterprise to
move right along with it. Since our annotation tool, VisageMap, is designed with
the necessary flexibility in mind, given sufficient data to work with and sufficient
manpower to drive it, we believe that MASKS can overcome the substantial head
start that biometric technologies have enjoyed.
In chapter 4, we pause in our larger enterprise of interference with automatic
face recognition to consider the more general problem of trying to deceive an adversary. We develop various strategies for minimizing the accurate information that the
adversary receives, as well as maximizing the likelihood of the adversary accepting
information designed to deceive.
Finally, in chapter 5, we evaluate the utility of our annotation work by completing
a statistical comparison of the most salient parameters of our data set. We check our
predictions on how best to disguise a face based on this analysis against synthetic
disguise techniques designed to affect isolated regions of the face.
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1.3

Privacy Baked Right In

In this section, we discuss some of the potential applications for the technology
developed for this thesis work. More data is certainly needed in order to get this
work into the realm of the practical, but we believe that the potential uses of this
work are quite compelling.
The most obvious application is to improve face recognition technology. As is the
case with cryptographic algorithms, identifying the weaknesses in face recognition
systems can only improve them in the long run. In particular, our annotated images
can help improve registration of features for face recognition systems that are trying
to move beyond unsupervised techniques.
While the initial thinking of this work was motivated with the idea of preventing
live recognition, requiring wearing some kind of partial mask all of the time, we’ve
found that in this and earlier work [2] that technology has long moved past the
stage where a pair of dark sunglasses might effectively disguise a majority of people.
Indeed, pretty aggressive countermeasures such as disabling the camera with a laser
or wearing a bandage that covers most of the head might be required. We could,
however, offer measurable definition of what it means for someone to have a nondescript appearance, and thus be able to identify those having a natural resistance
facial biometrics.
More interesting applications might be technology that purposely injects privacy
features somewhere between the imaging sensor and the ultimate user of the image.
For instance, social networking sites might offer a feature that locates and modifies
the faces in uploaded images so the identity of the participants cannot easily be
recovered. Each person’s appearance would be replaced by a photo-realistic avatar
that his friends would know is him, but others would not. If this was done well,
those not in-the-know may not even realize they are looking at a modified photo.
Another possibility is to build privacy features into surveillance systems, displaying a face with reduced identifying information for the benefit of security personnel.
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Often when there is a need for surveillance, there is no need to identify individual
until an event of interest is observed, such as shoplifting. This could reduce surveillance system abuses such as the sale of embarrassing celebrity footage to tabloids.
Such technology could start out as an amenity of, for example, a high-end hotel
chain, where the patrons may be willing to pay a premium for their privacy. Market
forces could drive the technology down to commodity status over time.
There may also be applications where identifying information is never needed.
For instance, say we wanted to build a system that monitored the aggregate health
of the people passing through an airport. This would be helpful for being able to
respond more quickly to the spread of a virulent contagion. In order to make the
system as sensitive as possible, we might want to use a lot of cameras to build
this, perhaps more than the average person would ordinarily would be comfortable
with. But what if we could provably assure them that they could not be identified
by the images recorded by these cameras? Since a lot of illness-related behaviors
are centered around the head, eliminating the entire face would vastly lower the
accuracy of the system. It would be hard to tell the difference between coughing or
taking a bite of a granola bar, or between sneezing and laughing. If we could remove
identifying information without eliminating the ability to detect the behaviors of
interest, we could achieve our goal without unnecessarily compromising the privacy
of our patrons.

1.4

Related Work

In the remainder of this chapter, we offer a brief overview that influenced the broad
strokes of the current enterprise. Work that had a more direct impact on ours is
mentioned throughout the remaining chapters of this dissertation. We are aware of
no other work that this work is a direct descendent of. Rather, it straddles several
traditionally unrelated disciplines.
10

In particular, we are aware of no published research that is conducting an indepth study of the failure modes of biometric technologies, and certainly not with
an application of privacy enhancement as a motivation. However, there has been
substantial work in measuring the performance of biometric technologies for potential
security applications, most prominently the face recognition trials conducted under
the FERET program [98, 104, 102], work that followed directly from it [91, 9], as
well as the follow-up Facial Recognition Vendor Test, FRVT, in 2002 [103] and
2006 [107]. The FERET program was the first public attempt to stimulate the
improvement of face recognition technologies, by providing a common set of faces
for the involved parties to work with and an independent evaluation of the state-ofthe-art as of 1996. The FRVT efforts are logical refinements of FERET, checking
to see how the technology has improved, as well as vastly expanding the size and
acquisition conditions of the testing data in order to provide increasingly challenging
face recognition problems. Our work with face recognition differs from FERET and
FRVT primarily in perspective: they are most interested in the errors that face
recognition systems make, while we are more interested in errors that they do not
make. That is, we are exploring opposite sides of the performance curve. We are also
interested in exploring data much farther from the performance boundary than a face
recognition researcher might. For instance, someone trying to improve their accuracy
might not be at all interesting in further study of faces that they get right every time,
while we are interested in studying such faces in detail. Face recognition researchers
might prefer to allocate their resources toward those faces that they almost got right,
thereby achieving incremental performance increases, where we are interesting in
seeing how we can disguise the same faces even better. Finally, since we are interested
in eliciting the worst performance we can get out of a face recognition system, we
are likely to try some pretty unusual methods of obscuring the face, methods which
those interested in security applications will probably ignore as unlikely. We are,
of course, interested in keeping up with published innovations in face recognition
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technology and its evaluation [56, 60, 66, 77, 116, 140, 141, 142, 85, 86, 12, 45, 49].
There has been an effort to formalize the development of gait recognition systems [106, 105] in a similar fashion as has been done for face recognition under
FERET/FRVT. This effort includes having collected a substantial database of video
sequences that gait researchers can use as a common test-bed, as well as a baseline
algorithm to set a minimal performance standard.
The study of military deception [51, 76, 146], particularly military camouflage
[109, 115, 132], has much in common with our research interests. Those engaged
in the design of modern military camouflage are certainly interested in defeating
automatic detection technologies, which have much in common with those used in
biometric recognition. Unfortunately, any theoretical work done in modeling past
and future camouflage techniques, if it exists, is classified, so we cannot compare it
to the current work. It should be clear, however, that if we succeed in achieving the
kind of generality we are striving for in our theoretical work, then it will be very
relevant to such military applications.
Our theoretical work has several cousins in the most well-developed area in the
privacy enhancing technology community: designing methods of anonymous communication over public networks, using mix networks, onion routing, or similar methods.
Several papers [113, 134, 149, 35, 120] have developed reasonable mathematical models of what constitutes “good enough” performance for this application, and, under
various specific attacks, derive boundary conditions under which performance can
drop to unacceptable levels. This is very similar to what we wish to accomplish for
our biometric countermeasures: we need a working definition of acceptable performance, and a solid framework for studying how we might achieve that performance
level.
Another paper [144] makes use of information theory within the privacy arena
in order to solve the problem of allowing researchers to offer goods or services to
consumers in exchange for accurate aggregate information, without each consumer
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having to actually offer correct personal information. It describes an interesting
protocol where a consumer can reveal personal information to the market researcher
through a proxy, which introduces noise within a stated margin of error.
There has also been some work toward privacy-friendly data mining [148, 36,
23, 139]. This work attempts to balance the need to protect personal information
entrusted to database holders with the need to be able to make reasonable use of
those databases. They provide means to compute accurate aggregating database
queries while still maintaining a privacy guarantee. This is done by deliberately
introducing errors into the data, either right from the start, or in a temporary copy
of the database used just to compute the query. The queries can then be computed
to within an acceptable margin of error, while any individual entry may not be at all
accurate, thus giving some degree of privacy to individuals whose information was
entrusted to the database holder.
We are aware of one paper [97] that addresses one of the core applications we
are working toward: they are also interested in a solution to the problem of sharing
surveillance footage with others without raising privacy issues. They prevent the
application of face recognition to video by replacing all of the faces with a single
amalgam face created from the eigenfaces generated by the original faces in the
video sequence. This method is offered as an alternative to blacking the faces out
entirely, while still offering a quantifiable privacy guarantee. Given that some faces
have more easily recognized features than others, however, we must question whether
the generated face could protect the constituent faces equally. Without the work we
are presenting in this dissertation, it does not seem possible to quantify the benefit
of this technique to any particular individual, but rather an aggregate benefit to the
group. Combining their technique with the knowledge gained by the present work,
however, could be quite powerful indeed.
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Chapter 2
More Than the Sum of its Parts:
A Customized High-Precision
Image Capture System
2.1

Introduction

In this chapter, we describe the creation of the raw images that are the basis of the
MASKS data set, a set of new facial images captured during the first phase of the
MASKS Project. This set of high-quality, carefully controlled images were taken
from April until December 2006 at the GRASP (General Robotics, Automation,
Sensing and Perception) Laboratory at the University of Pennsylvania.
In creating this data set, our goal was a large step forward toward a thorough
and human-understandable statistical model of how human faces vary in appearance.
To that end, we wanted a set of images that could be used to reconstruct precise
geometric measurements of facial features, with enough participants that we could
argue that we have established a baseline statistical distribution for at least a subset
of our facial measurements, which we describe in detail in chapter 3. While there
are other databases of facial images available for research purposes, all of them
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were inadequate for the needs of the current dissertation. Many of these image
sets are either low-resolution or depict a very small number of subjects, or both.
Most importantly for our purposes, no image set that we are aware of has controlled
gaze angle, distance from the cameras, and magnification to the extent that we
felt was necessary in order to reliably measure geometric features, including the
absolute size of each feature, not just size ratios. Ideally, we wanted a set of images
where the same pose and distance was used across all sessions and all subjects,
thereby allowing direct comparison of geometric features, with minimal geometric
correction required during analysis. We therefore decided to invest in the creation
of an image set tailored to our needs. Since this endeavor was rather costly, we
decided on specifications that would exceed our current research needs by a good
margin. Should our initial analysis prove promising, we could reanalyze the data set
at successively deeper levels of detail, hopefully giving our data longevity in return
for the substantial initial investment. We also believe that this data set, even in its
raw form, could be of great value for other researchers across a myriad of disciplines.
In the next section, we provide a detailed description of the equipment and software used in creating the image database. Next, we describe precisely how the
capture procedure was conducted. We continue with samples from the resulting image set, as well as a description of any significant problems we encountered and how
we handled them.

2.2
2.2.1

Equipment and Software
Still Cameras

The primary imaging for the project was done with three identical Canon EOS 20D
Digital SLR cameras, which have 8.2 megapixel CMOS sensors, 22.5 × 15.0mm in
size, with a maximum resolution of 3504 × 2336. Each camera was equipped with
16
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Figure 2.1: Detailed camera positioning within the capture rig. Rectangles indicate
the position of still cameras; ovals symbolize video cameras.

Canon EF 35mm f/2 lens copies1 , each fitted with Canon UV Haze Filter2 . For
reasons that will be explained fully in section 2.4, more than three copies of this
Canon 35mm lens were used to complete the data capture process. The cameras
were powered using Canon AC adaptor kits rather than relying on battery power,
and each had a 1GB compact flash card installed.
The three still cameras were intended to photograph each subject simultaneously
from 3 different perspectives. We also wanted those perspectives, at least for one set
of images, to be the same across all participating subjects, and the same across all
sessions for those subjects that participated more than once. The cameras, therefore,
needed to be securely mounted in order to keep their positions fixed during the nearly
8-month data capture process, and the invariance of the positioning needed to be
1

The 35mm focal length was chosen to get a so-called “normal” field of view with this camera,
i.e. approximately the field of view afforded by a human eye at the same position.
2
These filters are clear under indoor lighting conditions; they serve only to protect the lenses
and keep them clean.
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Figure 2.2: Capture rig: camera position schematic. Rectangles indicate the position
of still cameras; ovals symbolize video cameras.

regularly checked, and corrected if necessary.
It was decided to place the cameras along a straight line an equal distance apart,
in the arrangement indicated in figures 2.1 and 2.2. The distance between the cameras was chosen to be as far apart as possible while fitting inside the scaffolding cube
that houses the experiment, while still allowing room to accommodate additional instrumentation that we will describe later in this section. We chose a distance between
the center camera, camera1, and the intended position of the subject, indicated
by the label “imaging plane” in figure 2.1, of approximately 118cm. This distance
was chosen arbitrarily within the constraints of obtaining a reliable good-quality
autofocus and accommodating the subject and the rest of the equipment. The position of the imaging plane was very carefully marked on the floor using gaffer’s
tape, using a length of wire with the ends equidistant from the camera mount point
to aid in correct positioning. A point on the imaging plane was selected where we
intended to center our subjects, labeled as “subject target position” in figure 2.1.
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Figure 2.3: The capture rig viewed from above and behind the subject. Note the
tape markers on the floor, giving us an aid for visualizing the camera alignment.

The sight line of the center of camera1’s viewfinder was aligned to be perpendicular to the imaging plane, centered on the subject target position. Alignment was
accomplished by sighting along a straight edge through the camera’s viewfinder. A
small alignment target was placed along a vertical3 line that intersects the subject
target position, and the other cameras were turned inward so that their line-of-sight
intersected at the same target point, with the alignment determined using the same
sighting-along-a-straight-edge technique. Once aligned, they were clamped tightly
into place using mounting plates that were custom machined for the 20D camera
body chassis. Employing straight-edges, levels, and plumb lines, the sight lines of
all of the still cameras were marked on the floor using gaffer’s tape. These physical visualizations of the sight lines assisted in arranging the remaining cameras and
other equipment, as well as the subjects once we began recruiting them. A three
3

Vertical alignment throughout was determined using plumb lines.
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Figure 2.4: The capture rig viewed near the perspective of the subject.

dimensional schematic of the final camera arrangement is shown in 2.2, and several photographic views of the still cameras are shown in figures 2.3 through 2.54 .
The invariance of this aligned camera arrangement was verified at the beginning of
each day subjects would be imaged, and no significant alignment problems were ever
detected - this procedure will be described further in section 2.2.5.
It is important to note that the particular camera arrangement we ended up
choosing is not of critical importance to meeting the primary goal of this endeavor:
creating a set of high-quality images where precise geometric measurements are possible. However, in order to insure a consistent basis for measurement throughout the
data set, it was vital that the camera arrangement did not change over the course
of the experiment, hence the need to carefully verify the alignment at least once per
photo session day.
4

In photographs that depict the capture rig throughout this dissertation, small cameras mounted
on triangular plates are also visible. These cameras are used in an unrelated experiment that shares
the same physical space with MASKS.
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Figure 2.5: The capture rig viewed from outside, from the operator’s perspective.

The most important camera settings are summarized in table 2.1. Very detailed
information about the exact camera settings are recorded in the EXIF [39, 40] tags
that are stored in every image. More detailed information on the meaning of these
settings can be found in the manual for the EOS 20D, available on the Canon web
site5 . In order to make simultaneous shooting across the three cameras a possibility, one prerequisite was that the exposure time needed to be the same on all three
cameras, and the only way to insure this was to choose a fixed exposure time. We
therefore set the cameras in shutter-priority mode, which automatically adjusts the
diaphragm aperture to obtain a good exposure given the current selected shutter
speed. The shutter speed was fixed at 1/15 seconds. This speed is slower than we
would have liked, but it was the shortest speed that reliably achieved usable exposures for various test subjects under our laboratory lighting conditions. Section 2.2.3
will have more to say on how the synchronization between cameras was achieved.
5

http://www.usa.canon.com/ - a direct link to the product manuals does not appear to be
possible.

21

Figure 2.6: The video (left) and still (right) cameras used by this project, as installed
in the camera rig.

In order to obtain maximum image quality, we shot our images in raw mode, also
recording a highest-quality JPEG image for preview purposes. The resulting raw and
JPEG image files each require approximately 7 and 2.5 megabytes of disk storage
space, respectively. We also set the cameras to take a sequence of images as fast as
possible: that is, continuous drive mode. It was possible to take up to 6 images in
continuous drive mode before these large, raw images had filled the cameras internal
buffer space. Taking a succession of images as fast as possible maximized the chance
of catching at least one image in acceptable alignment and without serious flaws,
such as motion blur caused by eye blinks or other involuntary motion.
We chose an ISO speed of 200 to minimize noise under our lighting conditions;
the lighting was not bright enough to use ISO 100. We initially left the exposure
compensation setting at the default zero, letting the camera decide on the best
exposure level. We decided that it was worthwhile to change this setting part way
through the project, despite the resulting loss of consistency in exposure over the
data set. We will have much more to say about this decision in the remainder of this
chapter.
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Parameter
Exposure Program
Exposure Time
ISO
Image Recording Quality
JPEG Quality
JPEG Size
Exposure Compensation
White Balance
Drive Mode
Focus Mode
Color Space
Flash

Value
Shutter-priority AE
1/15 seconds
200
Raw + JPEG
Fine
Large (full 3504 × 2336 resolution)
variable
Automatic
Continuous
One-shot AF
sRGB
Off

Table 2.1: Important Still Camera Settings

2.2.2

Video Cameras

Figure 2.7: Frames from each of the video cameras (top, vfind and prof) taken
from a typical alignment check.

In addition to the still cameras, our capture system also employs three CCD video
cameras. Each of these cameras is a Sony DFW-SX900 fitted with a Cosmicar 8.5mm
1:1.5 television lens. These cameras are monitored from the capture workstation in
order to aid the precise positioning of subjects within the camera rig. The positions
of the three video cameras, labeled vfind, prof and top can be seen in figures 2.1
and 2.2. Sample frames from each of these cameras are shown in figure 2.7.
The camera vfind, which is used to visualize approximately what camera1 is
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seeing, is visible mounted below camera1 in each of the photographs in the previous
section. This camera is tilted upward slightly so that the center of its line-of-sight
intersects the line-of-sight of camera1 at the imaging plane. This was done purely
to replicate the view through the camera1 viewfinder as closely as possible given
the constraints of how close together the cameras could be mounted, differences
in resolution, et cetera. The location of this camera, as well as the limitations of
its improvised mounting system, made it especially prone to getting accidentally
knocked out of alignment. This camera was not, however, critical to the placement
of subjects, so it was realigned whenever it deviated significantly from the camera1
field of view. The alignment was done by pointing the camera at the same target
used to align the still cameras, with the aid of one-pixel-wide cross-hairs overlayed
onto each video frame by the video camera control software (more on the software in
section 2.2.5). This camera was operated at its maximum 1280 × 960 resolution and
close to the maximum 7.5 frames per second rate that these cameras are capable of
when internally triggered.

Figure 2.8: A view of the prof camera taken along the imaging plane from behind
its alignment plumb line. A red box has been drawn around the camera for emphasis.
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The profile camera, prof, was aligned with the imaging plane using a plumb line
that was also aligned with the plane, as defined by the tape line on the floor. A 1
pixel line was overlayed in red on all frames from this camera, as shown in figure
2.7, and this line of pixels was kept aligned with the plumb line throughout the
experiment. This arrangement is also depicted from just behind the plumb line in
figure 2.8. It is also this line of pixels that determined the correct distance between
the faces of the subjects and the still cameras during each image capture session.
We determined that this apparatus could detect any accidental linear movement
of the camera perpendicular to the imaging plane exceeding 1.5mm, or rotational
◦

movement out of the imaging plane exceeding 3.2 × 10−2 . As we shall explain in
sections 2.3 and 2.4.2, this alignment precision is far more than is actually needed
for consistent subject placement within our experimental tolerances.
The output of the top camera also employed a column of pixels marked with
a red overlay. This line was aligned with the camera1 sight line as marked with
gaffer tape on the floor, which in turn is aligned with the center of the camera1
viewfinder, as described in the previous section. Another plumb line is hung down
the center of the alignment target down to the camera1 sight line. This insures
that the plane defined by the parallel overlay and tape lines is truly vertical, thus
anything positioned at the red overlay line must also be positioned directly above the
camera1 sight line. This arrangement is shown in the leftmost image in figure 2.7
(the plumb will be difficult to see in a printed copy of this dissertation, but should
be visible in the full-color electronic original). The camera is mounted so that it
points toward the subject target position, approximately 15◦ from the vertical. This
inclination allowed us to better see some of the facial features from above while the
subject is looking directly into camera1. Using the red overlay aligned in this way
combined with the position of the subject’s visible facial features, we could measure
the subject’s gaze direction.
The prof and top cameras were both operated at a resolution of 960 × 720 at
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a rate of about 6 frames per second, which was the maximum frame rate achievable when using the external trigger interfaces and while maintaining an acceptable
exposure. Use of the external trigger feature was necessary to keep the prof and
top cameras synchronized, a necessity that we will explain further in the remainder
of this section. Running the cameras at less than maximum resolution was necessary because they shared a IEEE 1394 (Firewire) bus, which lacks the bandwidth
necessary to accommodate both cameras simultaneously with a full-sized frame. No
information useful to our experimental needs, however, was discarded by capturing
only part of each frame.
The settings of the cameras we have not already mentioned (gamma, gain, white
balance, etc.) were simply adjusted to let us see the subject and our test equipment as
clearly as possible. These settings were then fixed over the course of the experiment,
but the exact value of each parameter was not of particular importance.

2.2.3

Camera Control Hardware

In order to insure that the positioning of the subject and lighting conditions were
absolutely identical for the three different viewpoints afforded by our three still
cameras, it was necessary to find a way to trigger the shutter release from all three
cameras simultaneously. In order to accomplish this, we purchased a remote trigger
switch accessory for each camera and modified them to be controlled from a single
switch mounted on the custom control box depicted in figure 2.9. The remote trigger
devices, as supplied by Canon, mimic the behavior of the camera’s built in shutter
release switch exactly: pressing the switch halfway causes the camera to autofocus,
and holding the half-press locks in a successful autofocus. Pressing it the rest of the
way causes the shutter to release6 . We separated these two functions in our control
box, using a simple multi-pole toggle switch to control the focus lock, and controlling
6

There are various alternative settings on the cameras that alter the function of the full and
half button presses, but we elected to stick with the default settings.
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Figure 2.9: The camera control box.

the shutter release circuit with a separate push-button switch. Since the cameras
could take differing amounts of time to achieve focus lock, this design allowed us to
simply flip the toggle and wait for each camera to achieve focus. We could then keep
all of the cameras focus-locked while we conducted other checks, such as inspecting
metering information on each camera or checking subject alignment, all without
the awkwardness that keeping one hand on a control switch would entail. Finally,
when we were ready, we could press the separate shutter release button to take the
pictures.
The design of the shutter release circuit needed to be substantially more complicated than the simple switch used to control the focus lock function. A functional
diagram of this part of the control box is shown in figure 2.10. Designing the necessary electronics presented several challenges:
1. The control interface uses a proprietary connector, and it is not publicly documented by Canon. We therefore needed to purchase 3 of the remote trigger
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Figure 2.10: A functional diagram of the still camera shutter release control circuit.

units, cannibalize them, and reverse engineer how they worked. Fortunately,
the latter task was trivial since it turns out that the trigger boxes are just a
simple pair of switches rigged to close sequentially depending on how hard the
external plunger was pressed. There are no active components at all inside
these devices!
2. Unfortunately, the simplicity of these trigger devices meant that the control
interface connector was exposing internal camera power across its terminals,
a fact easily confirmed with a volt meter. In order to prevent unintended
electrical interactions, and perhaps damage to the cameras, each shutter release
control interface would need to be electrically isolated. This accounts for the
separate units marked “shutter release” in the functional diagram. We used
optoisolators to achieve this function in the final device.
3. In all electronically-controlled cameras, the shutter is not opened instantaneously when the shutter release button is pressed. There is a delay between
depressing the switch and the time that the shutter is actually opened. This
delay is called the shutter lag time. With digital cameras, this delay can be
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long enough to be immediately obvious to the camera operator. Even with
higher-end camera bodies, it is long enough to be measurable without specialized timing equipment. In order for simultaneous shooting to be possible, we
need to be able to predict when the shutter will open, so this shutter lag time
has to be a constant. Early testing of the EOS 20D indicated that it did indeed appear to be a constant (to within ±1ms) while in shutter-priority mode7 .
Surprisingly, however, this constant was different (by a few milliseconds) for
each camera body. Each camera, therefore, needed a separate control pipeline,
each with an adjustable delay unit that could be tuned to account for these
differences in shutter lag.
4. The remaining component in the functional diagram, marked “burst unit”
is a timer circuit that simulates holding the shutter release switch for the
approximately 2 seconds required to take 6 raw images, filling the cameras
buffer8 . Using a timer removes any inconsistency in how long the cameras
are told to keep taking pictures. The switch and multiplexer allow switching
between this burst-mode and manual-mode. In the latter mode, the shutter
switch on the control box behaves just like the camera’s own shutter switches,
modulo the action of the delay units. Throughout the text of this dissertation,
we also refer to groups of images captured using the burst-mode as “bursts”.
The control box also features an auto-shooting mode that simulates pressing the
shutter button, waiting for the camera buffers to drain, and repeating the process
as long as the switch is turned on. The timing of this circuit element was calibrated
7

This test was accomplished by taking pictures of a millisecond-precision stopwatch. We watched
through the viewfinder until the clock was rolling over to a new second and depressed the shutter,
and read the millisecond part of the display in the resulting image to obtain the lag time. This test
was repeated at least 10 times for each camera.
8
If the operator continues to hold down the shutter switch even after the buffer is full, the
camera will still continue to take pictures as fast it can, but the frame rate becomes quite slow
and, more importantly, the timing of exposures becomes unpredictable due to variability in how
long it takes to flush the image data to the compact flash drive. Synchronizing the images while
the buffers are full is therefore no longer possible.
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for burst-mode, but it also will work in manual mode. This mode was used for
convenience during the calibration process, and was not used in data production.
The remaining switch controls activation of the synchronization circuit that drives
the top and prof video cameras, mentioned previously. This circuit generates a
2ms period square wave, with a voltage ranging from 0 to 5V, which is the fastest
driving signal that the external trigger interface specifications allows.
In addition to all of the necessary control lines leading to all of the cameras, the
box also has a serial line connected to one of the computers used for the capture
process. A signal is sent to a daemon monitoring this serial line whenever the still
cameras are actively taking pictures. The daemon logs the exact start and stop times
of this signal, and uses that information to automatically save all of the video frames
that correspond to the still camera capture times.

2.2.4

Lighting and Other Instrumentation

The scene was lit partially by direct fluorescent lighting elements that make up the
primary lighting for the entire main GRASP laboratory space. This room lighting
was augmented by several, much brighter, fluorescent stage-lighting units. Much
of the light from the stage units is reflected into the environment by way of flash
umbrellas. Stray light sources from external windows and other experiments were
controlled as much as possible by draping the rig in heavy black canvas. Only
continuous lighting sources were used during capture - no flashes were used. Using
flashes would have made it difficult, if not impossible, to get usable exposures on
the video cameras. This is because we needed to be able to view the subject on the
video cameras under ambient lighting while we were getting them in position. If we
added more lighting via flashes while shooting, the video images would end up badly
overexposed. Adding flashes would also add another timing-sensitive element to an
already complex system with regard to time synchronization issues.
We initially left the stage lighting as configured for the other experiment that is
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colocated with MASKS in order to avoid experimental conflicts. After noting a very
noticeable variation in autofocus accuracy in the initial group of subject photos, we
decided that making some lighting changes would indeed be necessary in order to
optimize the performance of our cameras for our experiment. We therefore reduced
or, where possible, eliminated back-lighting of the subject, and added more direct
lighting. This allowed us to obtain good exposures with smaller average aperture
diameters, which in turn gave us more depth of field to work with.

9

Since, in

practice, the autofocus system cannot always locate the subject’s position perfectly,
a greater depth of field gives the autofocus system a larger range of “acceptable”
focus points. A smaller aperture yields a greater depth of field, however since our
exposure time is necessarily fixed, we are limited on how small the aperture can be
and still obtain a usable exposure.
We had also noticed that the 20D’s auto-exposure tended to overexpose slightly,
clipping the highlights in our images. The new, brighter lighting made this problem
much worse, so we decided to adjust each cameras exposure compensation setting to
stop the aperture down even further, again improving depth of field, but also making
better use of the dynamic range of the imaging sensor. The exposure compensation
settings were chosen to match the exposure recommended by a professional-grade
light meter, and the resulting improvement in exposure quality was verified by comparing the histograms of test images taken under various lighting conditions. We
will have more to say about the results of these changes in section 2.4.
In addition to the many physical markers and plumb lines used to maintain
camera alignment, there are two more important pieces of instrumentation visible
in figure 2.11 and in many of the sample photographs throughout the rest of this
chapter. The first of these is the large digital clock/timer. This device has similar
functions to an inexpensive digital watch, with the obvious exception of having 4inch-high display elements, with each element composed of an array of discrete LEDs.
9

Depth of field refers to the distances in front of and behind the actual focal point of an optical
system that nonetheless appears to be in sharp focus.
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Figure 2.11: Frames taken from each still camera during a typical autofocus check.

This device is not used to show the current time, but rather it is set to its 1/100second precision stopwatch mode, which is started and left running whenever we
are capturing images. Since the timing of the images between the video cameras
and the still cameras cannot be synchronized using the hardware methods we used
for cameras of the same kind, we are using the time displayed on this clock to
identify correlated video sequences with still camera images, thus allowing us to
guarantee that we know how where each subject is sitting and how they are posed
at the time each still image is taken. As mentioned in the previous section, the still
camera imaging time was also recorded by use of the serial line out of the camera
control box. The video frames are also timestamped, and we found that so long
as the computers involved had synchronized clocks10 , the differences between the
timestamps were accurate to within about 50ms, based upon what we could infer
from examining images of the running clock device. This timestamp accuracy is
close enough for most of our experimental needs. The clock, however, is present
and running throughout all of the subject sessions, so we always have the superior
precision available to us in case we discover inconsistencies in the automatically
extracted timing information, or if finer timing data is otherwise desirable.
Given how our cameras are arranged, it is geometrically impossible for the clock
to appear in all of the cameras simultaneously. We relied on the synchronization of
the cameras to insure the correct sequencing of frames across all six cameras. The
10

Synchronization was done via NTP, the Network Time Protocol. The correct functioning of
this time synchronization was checked at least once per subject-session-day.
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Figure 2.12: Frames taken from each still camera during a typical time synchronization check.

synchronization of the still cameras was checked at least once per subject-sessionday simply by taking pictures of the clock and examining the configuration of the
LEDs in the corresponding images; a sample of such a test sequence is shown in
figure 2.12. The synchronization of the video cameras was also checked in this way,
but not nearly so often as positioning the clock so that the prof and top cameras
can see it was a fairly tricky and precarious operation, and prior experience in other
experiments that required synchronizing a large number of these cameras led us to
believe that the mechanism was reliable. We did, however, check the correspondence
of the video camera synchronization and the stored frame timestamps. That is, we
checked that the synchronized cameras had reasonably synchronized timestamps on
the newest available video frames. We started by checking the timestamp consistency
only once per day, but noticed that, in practice, the timestamps could drift well
out of correspondence11 , so we started to check and correct this at least once per
subject-session. Note that this isn’t a problem with the synchronization of the video
cameras, but just with the relative accuracy of timestamp produced by the video
capture software.
Due to a conflict between the constraints of our experimental setup and the technical limitations of the synchronization mechanism offered by the video cameras, it
11

The video cameras lack an internal clock, so they cannot internally time stamp video frames.
The time stamp that we store for each file is generated on the computer receiving the frames, so
anything that might delay that computer from receiving a given frame diminishes the accuracy of
the timestamp.
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was also not possible to synchronize the camera vfind with the other video cameras.
This, however, was not a serious problem: since vfind is positioned so that it can
always see the clock, we can always recover the time-correspondence information
manually, should we ever need it.
The second piece of instrumentation can be seen near the left edge of the photographs in figures 2.11 and 2.12, and in many of the other images throughout this
dissertation. This consists of a checkerboard pattern of black and white squares,
each with sides 1 cm long. This card hangs in the imaging plane (or very close to it),
the same plane that we intend each subject’s facial plane to be aligned with. This
can be used as a convenient scale reference when trying to judge the absolute size
of facial features when analyzing photographs, or to verify any scale information we
compute using optical geometry. The precise position of this card within the facial
plane was not particularly important, and indeed it was moved significantly farther
toward the edge of the imaging area over the course of the experiment, once we had
decided it getting a better view of the right side of each subject’s head was much
more desirable than seeing all of the card. A color reference card was also added
to this scale reference card part way through the experiment in order to aid the
accuracy of color correction during post-processing of the images, though the color
of the 1 cm squares can be, and were, also used for this purpose.

2.2.5

Software

A substantial suite of specialized software was required to glue the capture system
together and manage the resulting very large data set. In this section, we give an
overview of the major software components and their function. This section is not,
however, intended as a comprehensive manual for this collection of software. Most of
these programs have their own built-in help features and/or substantial commenting
of the source code which better serves that function.
In addition to the capture software, we have built tools that are likely to be
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of interest to users of the MASKS image set: tools for managing, exploring, and
analyzing the image data. These are described in the two chapters following this
one, as well as in appendix B.

2.2.5.1

Still Camera Interface

The still cameras were all connected via a USB2 bus to a workstation running Linux
kernel version 2.6.8 on top of a computer equipped with an x86 processor. The USB2
bus was used primarily to download images from the camera’s flash memory cards
and to otherwise manage the flash memory storage. The software used to talk to the
cameras over USB, using a proprietary Canon protocol, was a modified version of
the gphoto2 command line program and the underlying library libgphoto2, both
developed as part of the open source gphoto project[52]. Specifically, our production
version is based on version 2.1.6 of both the library and command line utility. The
changes from the distributed version include some minor bug fixes (most of which
have since appeared in later versions of the gphoto2 distribution) and some very
large performance improvements tailored to our specific model of camera servicing
our particular application.
We also wrote a front-end to gphoto2 called stillcam that provides a commandline user interface better suited for MASKS project use, making interaction with
the cameras less error-prone and less unwieldy than calling gphoto2 directly. In
particular, it does some sanity checking to be sure that the cameras are in the
expected state before and after a burst of pictures is taken of a subject, and, critically,
it is designed to prevent accidental loss of irreplaceable images. It insures that we
already have copies of everything on the cameras before deleting anything from their
internal storage. It also interfaces with our subject management system: this is so
that the correct subject ID and the shooting time is encoded in every file name, new
files are stored in the right subject directory in our data repository, the desired file
ownership and permission settings are imposed, et cetera.
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2.2.5.2

Video Camera Interface

Figure 2.13: A view of the capture station monitor during a calibration check. The
Coriander display windows for each of the video cameras can be seen, along with
the capture control shell.

The video cameras were connected via IEEE 1394 (Firewire) buses to two rackmounted x86-based computers, each running the Linux kernel, version 2.6.1012 . The
software interface to the cameras is a highly modified version of Coriander [30], an
open-source project dedicated to controlling video cameras of the type we were using.
The typical user interface shown during a capture session can be seen in figure 2.13,
but most of the real work is happening behind the scenes. In particular, our variant
of Coriander handles receiving each video frame sent by the cameras, inserting the
red alignment lines shown in figure 2.7 and all other video camera frames in this
chapter, displaying them, and writing them to disk storage for later use. It also
provides a graphical user interface for controlling the many features and options
12

This version of the kernel was the first to properly support IEEE 1394 uncompressed IIDCcompliant video streams.
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that the cameras have exposed.
Our production version is based on distributed version 1.0.1, but extensive modifications were necessary for MASKS project use. A summary of the necessary changes
follows:
• The first major problem was that we needed to view the output of all three
video cameras simultaneously, in near real-time. Although Coriander does
support configuring and controlling more than one video camera connected to
the same machine with a single instance of the program, frames from only one
of those cameras can be displayed at any given time. We explored solutions
to this shortcoming involving displaying frames after they are written to disk,
or using the provided v4l (Video for Linux) interface, but each of these proved
to be too slow or too unreliable or both. We settled on simply attempting
to run a separate instance of the program for each camera. Coriander is not
designed to allow this either, at least when run on the same machine by the
same user, so some small changes were necessary to the program itself and to
the runtime environment of each instance in order to keep one instance from
interfering with the operation of another. We also modified the GUI to have
informative window labels in order to help distinguish which element belongs
to which instance. For the case when more than one camera was connected
to the same computer, code was added to match the correct camera with the
desired Coriander instance and ignore the other cameras, which are attached
to other instances.
• The distributed version of Coriander supports saving video frames directly to a
filesystem for later use, which was obviously necessary in order to document the
positioning of our subjects. If left running continuously, however, the framesaving pipeline module will keep capturing frames until the target filesystem is
full, or until either or both of the save module or the cameras themselves are
manually disabled. Disabling the cameras also obviously disables the visual
37

display, and turning the save module on and off repeatedly affects the priority
of the save module within Coriander, which caused the frame rate of the video
going to the filesystem to drop

13

. We therefore added support for a circular

buffer to the saving module: a disk space budget, in megabytes, can be specified
in the GUI, and the oldest frames on the filesystem are automatically deleted to
make room for new frames, keeping total usage within the budgeted constraint.
• Coriander came with skeletal support for graphical overlays for the displayed
video, but not exactly what we needed for our alignment markers. We added
the types of overlay patterns we wanted and some new UI elements for adjusting
their positioning. We also added support for inserting the overlays in the saved
frames as well as the displayed ones, which was not previously possible.
• We found it necessary to mount some of our cameras upside-down, so we added
support for automatically rotating the frames to the expected orientation.
• We added or repaired selected keyboard and mouse bindings, and removed
others, in order to aid efficient and correct operation of the program during a
capture session.

2.2.6

Capture Shell and Monitor Daemon

A specialized shell, capshell, was written in order to make the expected sequence
of operations during a capture session available as simple, mostly argument-free,
commands. For efficient operation, each command name starts with a unique letter,
and the commands can be abbreviated to this single letter. In addition, the shell
incorporates a state machine that encodes the normal sequence of commands, and
13

We could have also solved this problem by redesigning the image pipeline so that the save
module is always given the highest possible priority, and we went as far as adding support for
turning the save module on and off via remote control, but we ultimately decided that solving
this problem would have been a tremendously larger undertaking than the buffering we chose to
implement.
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Figure 2.14: A state machine illustrating the basic capture loop.

displays the expected next command in brackets. If the operator wants to execute
the default command, they need only press the return key. The core of this capture
command loop is shown in figure 2.14; the meaning of the states in this diagram
break down roughly as follows:

init

Calls newsubj to set up for a capture session, creating
new directories and setting permissions as necessary.
Defaults to selecting a new subject ID number, allows
re-opening an existing subject ID if a valid existing subject number is specified.

download Calls stillcam to download new images from the still
cameras, if any. If the cameras are all empty, it guesses
we are done with a session, and moves to the finish
state.
39

empty

Calls stillcam to delete the contents of the cameras,
checking to be sure we have everything we want safely
stored.

clean

Calls stillcam to clean up temporary files created during the download process, checking to be sure we’re finished with them.

finish

Calls donesubj to close out the current subject, correcting permissions and ownership of data as necessary
and generating and storing SHA1 signatures for all new
files. Cleans up in preparation for the next subject.

There are also some error states, omitted from figure 2.14 for clarity, that represent some intelligent handling of some kinds of malfunctions that might be encountered during the capture process. These are detected through sanity checks
incorporated into the operation of the shell, and brought to the attention of the
operator as appropriate.
As mentioned previously, a daemon running on a third rack-mount computer
system listens for shutter trigger events from the camera control box via its serial
line. When the daemon wakes up, it notes the start and stop times that the control
box was active. If the system is currently photographing a subject, it notifies another
program to copy all of the video frames that correspond to these times to that
subject’s data directory14 .

2.2.6.1

Testing Suite

At least once per subject-session-day, before the first subject arrives, having turned
all of our cameras and lights on, we carefully re-checked the alignment of each video
14

If the system does not indicate the presence of an active subject, we assume we are shooting
for test purposes, and do not save video frames by default. If we really want to save test frames
for some reason, the special subject ID number 0000 is reserved for this purpose.
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camera using techniques similar to those used to align them the first time, as described above in subsections 2.2.1 and 2.2.2. We also take some test pictures with
both the alignment target and a mannequin for consideration with regard to autofocus accuracy, time synchronization, and still camera settings; samples of these are
shown in figures 2.7, 2.11, and 2.12.
Once we have recorded our sample pictures, we run the test suite front-end
dailycheck. This program defaults to completing all of the following tests:
1. Checks to insure all computers involved in the capture system have their clocks
correctly synchronized. Synchronizes the internal clocks of the still cameras to
that of the capture computer and double-checks the result.
2. Checks to be sure that the monitor daemon that listens to the control box is
running.
3. Checks that the video cameras have the expected settings. This test uses some
lightly modified modules from Coriander with a new front end to dump out
the internal state of each camera.
4. Checks that Coriander settings, other than camera-internal states already
verified in the previous step, are as expected. These settings include things
like the overlay controls, display settings, the frame storage directory, etc.
5. Checks that the timestamps for captured frames from video cameras top and
prof are consistent at the time of the test.
6. Checks that the still camera settings are as expected. This is done by downloading the test images that we took for this purpose and examining the EXIF
tags in each image. These tags record almost every setting on the camera at
the time the image is taken, including the subset of settings that were important to keep fixed for the duration of our experiment. Once done scanning
the EXIF tags, the images are displayed so that we can examine them for
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autofocus accuracy, a redundant check of alignment, and a check on the time
synchronization of corresponding still camera images.
There is also a program testrun that simply pulls all of the images from the
cameras, brings them up in a viewer, and empties them in the background, bypassing
all of the usual data-loss safety checks to make this process as quick as possible.
This is obviously only done when we are only capturing test images that we are very
certain are disposable.

2.3

The Capture Process

This section provides some of the details of how human subjects were employed for
the MASKS project. This includes an overview of how subjects were recruited for
the project, and a detailed description of a typical capture session.

2.3.1

Regulatory Approval

The protocol governing this experiment, titled “Customized Human Face Masking
for Privacy Enhancement” was submitted to Institutional Review Board that is
responsible for oversight of experiments involving human research subjects conducted
at the University of Pennsylvania. This protocol, number 801699, was originally
approved on October 18, 2004, and has been reviewed and re-approved roughly
annually since then, and regulations require that our activities must continue to be
reviewed as long as we are making active use of the data.

2.3.2

Subject Recruitment

Potential subjects self-selected: they simply responded to advertisements for the
project. No attempt was made to normalize the population for any particular demographic target. Potential subjects needed only to be able to comply with our
42

Total subject count
Subject count completing 4-session time series
Male subjects
Female subjects
Poses per session
Perspectives per pose
Images per camera per pose
Total still images per session
Average session storage requirements
(includes video sequences)
Total subject session count
Total database size

303
51
176
127
3
3
6
54
553 megabytes
479
259 gigabytes

Table 2.2: Some statistics on the final subject population
instructions with regard to pose, which merely meant being able to understand the
instructions and having sufficient muscle control to remain relatively still while pictures are actively being taken. Each session was to last no longer than 30 minutes,
and subjects were compensated for their time with a small fee commensurate with
other non-medical experiments being conducted in the Philadelphia region.
Advertisements were circulated via electronic mailing lists within the University
of Pennsylvania and via other localized electronic distribution services. Advertisement posters were also posted throughout the University and around the neighborhood.
We had a recruitment target of 300 subjects, which we were able to meet with
a final subject count of 303 individuals, including 3 of the project researchers. Although no demographic information was explicitly collected, as one might expect
when the majority of the local population consists of college undergraduates, the
apparent age of the participants is biased toward the early- to mid-twenties. There
are, however, a significant number of older participants as well. With regard to the
sex distribution in the final data set, we counted a total of 176 male participants
and 127 female. These counts, and a few other pertinent statistics, are summarized
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in table 2.2 for easy reference.
There is a unexplained result from the face recognition literature where face
recognition performance can drop dramatically if the age of a reference photo is even
a few months old, let alone as much as a year out-of-date. Our working theory is
that there are real, but subtle changes in appearance, ephemera that our innate face
recognition ability knows to ignore, but since automatic face recognition systems
lack the necessary knowledge to separate stable features from rapidly-changing ones,
they can been led astray by this misleading data. In order to study this further, we
were also interested in having some subjects participate in repeated sessions so that
we might study whether we can detect any measurable changes in appearance that
might happen over relatively short time scales. We therefore recruited a subset of
the early subjects to return for an additional 3 sessions, with a minimum of 30 days
between sessions. The number of participants with that completed all 4 sessions
totaled 5115 . Since this is more of a side experiment, this time-series data has not
yet been analyzed at the time of this writing. In any case, this is a problem that we
think the face recognition research community will solve sooner rather than later, so
we don’t think it will be a useful long-term strategy for preventing recognition.

2.3.3

The Capture Procedure

Upon arriving for a session, the subject is asked to read the informed consent form,
signing once any questions they may have are answered. A new session is started via
the capture shell, and the subject is led inside the camera rig, where the locations
of the study cameras are pointed out16 . We briefly review with the subject how the
mechanics of the session will run, which we describe in detail through the remainder
15

There are also 7 participants who completed 2 sessions, and 8 that completed 3. There is still
a possibility of arranging for a few of these subjects to return for another session while the capture
apparatus is still available.
16
There are many other cameras mounted in the rig. These are used by other projects that share
the same space, so it is useful as part of the subject enrollment process to make it clear exactly
which cameras will be taking pictures of them.
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of this section.
First, the operator helps the subject sit roughly in the right position, and then
returns to the capture workstation to examine the subject’s position with regard
to the alignment markers. He issues verbal instructions to the subject, making
necessary fine adjustments in order to get as close as possible to the ideal alignment
point.

Figure 2.15: Frames from each of the video cameras taken from the saved video
sequence of a typical subject session, showing alignment with the red markers within
the tolerances required for the experiment.

A set of sample frames17 taken from a captured video sequence from a typical
session is shown in figure 2.15, illustrating acceptable alignment. It is worth going
into some detail as to the thinking behind the alignment process, and what constituted “acceptable” for us. Our goal was to be able to recover as much geometric
information about our subject’s facial features as if we had the luxury of taking
direct measurements using calipers, angle gauges, and the like. In order to recover
such measurements from a still photograph using the geometry of our optical system, we needed to know exactly how the subject was posed, and in order to recover
absolute (versus relative) scale information, we needed to know how far they are
from our imaging apparatus. The simplest way we could think of accomplishing this
17

This sample, and any other sample that is likely to appear in publications stemming from the
MASKS project, depicts one of the members of the MASKS research group. In order to protect the
privacy of our research subjects, we agreed not to publish or otherwise publicly exhibit the likenesses
of our subjects without obtaining separate permission to do so, and any researchers wishing to use
the MASKS data must also agree to this restriction as part of the licensing process.
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was to pick a somewhat arbitrary position in front of the cameras, close enough to
fill a good portion of the frame with the face of the subject while accommodating
our other equipment. We would then try to get every subject’s face as close to that
position as possible. This position is marked “subject target position” in figure 2.1.
We use the red overlay line seen in the prof camera frames as the defining marker
for this distance alignment. This software line is itself aligned with several marked
physical positions in the camera rig, as described in detail in section 2.2.1.
There is a subtlety to what constitutes correct alignment to this marker: we are
trying to align a straight line to a facial profile, something that is not at all flat
for most people. Most people do, however, have a reasonably flat prominence of
the upper brow, and it is this flat region that we tried to align with the marker
if possible, asking the subject to tilt their head up or down to achieve the desired
position. Where such a flat region was not apparent, we used an imaginary line
between the prominences of the brow and the chin instead.
In order that the angles defined by facial feature positions be directly comparable across subject, we also needed the pose of the head to be equivalent across
all subjects, so we simply arranged for each subject to look directly into camera1,
the center still camera. More precisely, we chose an angle for the head where the
subject’s apparent gaze direction is perpendicular to the imaging sensor plane. The
red line in the top camera frame allows us to judge gaze direction using cues such
as the direction the top of the nose is pointing, and how close the flat parts for the
face are to being perpendicular to the guide line. The correctness of this alignment
is easiest to see when the subject is positioned so that the guide line bisects their
head, and the nose lies directly along the guide line, but as we shall describe in more
detail in the next section, this right-to-left alignment was not always achievable, and
a gaze-line parallel to the red marker is sufficient in any case. We refer to this first,
highly controlled position as pose A.
Once alignment appears to be good, the subject is instructed to adopt a neutral
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Figure 2.16: A schematic of the subjects positioning within the camera rig, for each
of the 3 poses that compose a complete session. We will refer to these poses, from
left to right, as pose A, B and C. The lines depict sight lines of the still cameras
and the grey boxes depict the positions of these cameras, in direct correspondence
to the similar markings in figure 2.1.

facial expression, and is asked to remain still while a picture burst is taken. A
download of the resulting images is started, and a sample of the still images are
automatically displayed on the capture workstation as soon as they are available.
The operator uses these samples to verify that they are of sufficient quality, and the
complete still and video image sequences are then available for inspection in order
check that correct alignment was maintained. This inspection was done using the
sinspect and vinspect programs, described further in appendix B.
If the resulting image set was judged acceptable, we moved on to poses B and
C, illustrated in figure 2.1618 . Neither of these poses is nearly as controlled as pose
A, but we used the viewfinders to make the gaze angle as close to perpendicular to
camera2 and camera3 for poses B and C, respectively, as was possible without
additional cameras and instrumentation. Since our aim with these poses was simply
to get a complete ear-to-ear view of the face, this level of control was sufficient for
18

In the first few sessions of the project, in particular those for the first sessions of subjects
0001 through 0006, the subject was just pivoted, so they remained close to the same distance
from cameras as in pose A. After reviewing the results, we decided to move the subjects closer in
order that no instrumentation obscured any part of the face, and that we might get a little more
detail. We can scale the images using information from pose A if we decide we want to compare
the different perspectives on the same scale.
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us.
In the next section, we present a sample set of subject images, describe some of
the problems encountered in collecting the data set, and offer an overall assessment
of the quality of the data set.

2.4
2.4.1

The Unprocessed MASKS Data Set
Samples

Figure 2.17: A sample from each camera from a complete subject session. Pictures
are taken, from left to right, with camera2, camera1, and camera3; we present
them in this order to echo the physical arrangement of the cameras. The top, middle
and bottom rows are examples of poses A, B and C, respectively.

In this section, we simply display some representative samples drawn from the
MASKS database. Figure 2.17 depicts a sample of each of the still images, one
from each camera, representing all three poses. Recall that each time the operator
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activates the shutter release button on the camera control box, 6 images are taken as
fast as the cameras can take them, until the cameras fill their internal buffers. Each
of these bursts, therefore, consists of 18 images, and the 3 bursts, corresponding to
the three poses, yield 54 images total. The remainder of the images are typically
substantially similar to these samples, but also contain involuntary movements like
swaying of the upper body or blinking, which may be of interest to some researchers.
The images shown here, as is the case for all of the still camera images exhibited in
this chapter, are the JPEG images produced internally in the cameras. Our cameras
are also configured to simultaneously record in Canon Raw (CR2) format. In order to
avoid any artifacts that might be introduced during the very fast JPEG compression
done by the camera, the greater bit depth of the raw format, and other advantages,
these raw images are what the later stages of the MASKS project are based on19 .

19

Any differences between the appearance of the camera-generated JPEGs and our processed
CR2 files are likely to be difficult or impossible to see in a printed medium, in any case.
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Figure 2.18: Full-resolution samples taken from pose B on camera1 (center picture
in figure 2.17). This illustrates the extraordinary level of detail available in a typical
MASKS photograph.
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Figure 2.18 is a full-page collage of sample patches, each taken from the indicated
region of the photograph, shown at their actual scale. Because of the very high
resolution of these images, it is not possible to fit the entire face at full size onto
a typical printed page, let alone the entire frame. As we will explain at length in
the next section, although not every image is quite this sharp at full resolution, the
vast majority of them are. It is not at all unusual for individual facial hairs and fine
textural details of the skin to be resolved, and in some cases even smaller features
are clearly visible, such as vasculature of the eye or some of the fine details of the
iris.

2.4.2

Unexpected Challenges

While the MASKS image capture process mostly ran smoothly, as with any enterprise
on this scale, some problems did occasionally crop up. In this section, we describe
some of the more interesting glitches we encountered. This is, of course, especially
important to consider with regard to the possibility of measurement error, which we
will highlight as necessary. The details of our experience may also be useful to other
researchers who may wish to conduct a similar experiment, or else adapt some of
our techniques to an unrelated problem domain.
2.4.2.1

Posing Human Subjects

Once we had decided that we wanted to control distance and angle of the subject
with respect to the cameras, we considered various possibilities for accomplishing
this. One way of doing it would be to build the framing structure on tracks so
that it could be moved precisely to align with a roughly placed non-moving subject.
Some medical imaging equipment, such as dental x-ray machines, use this technique.
It allows for positioning that could be more directly controlled by the operator.
Unfortunately, it was clear from the early design stages that building the camera
rigging in this way was not possible within our budgetary constraints. Instead, we
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decided to fix the cameras in particular positions, and move the subject to the desired
location. We also considered building a restraint device in order to assist consistent
placement of the subject, and to prevent the movement of the subject once positioned
correctly, but this presented problems both due to additional regulatory hurdles, and
the difficulty of designing such a device so that it did not obscure parts of the face
from one or more of the perspectives we were interested in capturing, as well as the
aforementioned budgetary constraints.
Instead, we opted to try out a very simple approach: place the subject in close to
the correct position, and issue verbal instructions while monitoring live video feeds
that included placement guide lines. The subject and operator therefore cooperatively fine-adjusted the subject’s pose into the desired position. Trying out this
scheme with our first few subjects produced very encouraging results. The early
subjects were easily able to understand adjustment instructions, and make the subtle movements needed to get into position. In every case, we inspected the captured
video sequences for correct alignment, and repeated the pose if necessary until we
achieved acceptable results. We expended extra effort, if necessary, on pose A, the
most valuable pose for our current research goals.
Unfortunately, over the course of photographing more than 300 subjects, we
were not always able to achieve ideal results within the 30 minutes allocated for
each session. The cause of this difficulty most often stemmed from the operator
and the subject not really sharing a common language, and it was thus troublesome
to efficiently communicate the specific movements needed to correct the subject’s
positioning. A very few subjects seemed to understand the instructions, but lacked
fine enough motor control to either make very small movements of the upper body, or
else had trouble maintaining the correct position long enough to obtain a complete
set of images. Problems of this nature were aggravated by the possibility of a bad
focus, an issue we will go into in detail in the next section. In cases where ideal
results could not be obtained within our time constraints, we simply kept the best
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images we had of each pose, believing that keeping even flawed data was worth at
least the cost of its storage.
We think it is likely that the alignment problems in some sessions will either be
within the range of our measurement error, or might be correctable. In particular,
while absolute scale information will be easiest to compare for subjects the same
distance from the camera, we calculated that given any 1 cm object, for its image
size to change by the smallest quantity we can measure, one pixel, it would need
to move toward or away from the camera lenses by about ±2.8 cm20 , and the vast
majority of our subjects are positioned well within this tolerance. It is possible
that the subjects that lie outside our measurement tolerance can be corrected by
measuring the actual distance from their face to the imaging plane, and scaling their
measurements appropriately. Similarly, there are some subjects whose gaze direction
deviates slightly from perpendicular to the imaging sensor, but we can measure their
actual gaze direction from the top video camera frames, and we should be able to
correct small deviations geometrically. The necessity for any such corrections will
depend on comparing the magnitude of the error with the actual statistical variances
in the measurements that we make on the well-aligned data.
Another very small subset of the subject pool had, for example, hair or nonremovable jewelry that obscured parts of the face that we ideally would have liked
to capture, or else very prominent use of facial cosmetics that interfered with the
accuracy of metering or autofocus. We elected to live with problems of this nature
rather than, for example, requesting that subjects come without make-up.
Finally, we were pleasantly surprised by the ability of the majority of subjects to
sit still well enough for us to easily verify that they remained in the same position
through the duration of a picture burst. In fact, most remained still enough over
the entire video sequence that it is not critical to identify the video frames closest to
20

This tolerance has also been verified experimentally. The value of the tolerance scales linearly
with the size of the feature, for instance a 50 mm feature would have the same extent in the image
within a range of ±5.6 cm; a 2 cm feature would have a halved tolerance: ±1.4 cm.
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each still frame: the whole frame sequence is simply close enough to identical for our
needs. There are a few cases, however, where some motion-blurring occurred, most
commonly due to an eye blink, but as long as only one or two frames contained such
blurring artifacts, we did not bother to re-shoot the pose.
2.4.2.2

Autofocus

When reviewing the early results of our data collection effort, and in particular,
when viewing the still images at full zoom, we noticed that while almost all of
the images were sharp enough for our current research needs, some of the images
were extraordinarily sharp, showing much more fine detail than we expected. Since
having more detail would certainly give this data set more longevity, we began an
investigation into whether there was something we could do to obtain this very fine
autofocus accuracy more reliably21 .
Since at least one set of our pictures is precisely distance controlled, and that
distance is held constant over the course of the whole experiment, one obvious strategy is simply to focus the cameras manually. Unfortunately, this was not possible
due to a puzzling fact about our chosen camera bodies. As explained in section 2.2.3
and earlier, we wanted to be able to take simultaneous images in the still camera,
and a critical prerequisite to making this happen was a predictable shutter lag time.
While the shutter lag time was indeed a constant for each camera while set to oneshot autofocus mode, our early experimentation indicated that the shutter lag was
not fixed when the cameras were set to manually focus22 .
21

At this point, we made a modification to the capture shell such that sample images were shown
at full size. Why not do this in the first place? It was simply a question of efficiency. Before
this change, we displayed the images large enough to fill the monitor since viewing at this size
was near instantaneous while still showing much of the image detail, whereas viewing at full zoom
required considerably more time to display. Also, with the monitor we were using on the capture
workstation, a full-size image was approximately 6 times the size of the monitor, so it was not
possible to see all important parts of the image at once, forcing the operator to scroll the image,
which was also a fairly slow process.
22
We’ve never arrived at a satisfactory explanation for why this might be the case. Once focus is
achieved, whether by manually adjusting the lens, or by half-pressing the shutter button to achieve
autofocus lock, the rest of a picture taking operation should be the same. Oddly, we found that
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We therefore experimented with various possibilities for improving autofocus accuracy. An ideal starting point for this endeavor would have been gaining an understanding of how well the autofocus was meant to work in the first place, i.e. a clear
engineering specification on the limits of the autofocus system. Unfortunately, such
a specification has been remarkably difficult to find. The most useful information
we could find was a very informative thread on understanding the Canon autofocus
system on an online digital photography forum. The relevant section is as follows:
If the camera places the actual focused plane within the depth of focus
range, the intended focused plane of the subject should “look sharp” on
a 6x9-inch print from a distance of 10 inches. In “high precision mode”
the intended plane of focus should “look sharp” on about an 11x14-inch
print at 10 inches (extrapolating from the standard size given by Canon
for normal mode).
Source: User RDKirk at
http://www.fredmiranda.com/forum/topic2/241524
This specification has been widely repeated elsewhere, but appears not to come
directly from any official source, and we were unable to find anything more authoritative23 . In any case, based on this standard, it was clear that our average results
were autofocusing well within their design specification. That is, it is only telling
us that the autofocus system was not malfunctioning. We were simply getting some
results where the camera was behaving beyond its specifications. It still remained
the cameras were subjectively much less responsive when set to manually focus versus an autofocus
setting when shooting the same subject under the same lighting conditions. We can only speculate
that the camera takes a significantly different control path when placed in manual focus mode, and
perhaps this control path is not as finely tuned as the autofocus path.
23
The closest we could find was an article on the on the European Canon Professional support
site, specifically http://www.cps.canon-europa.com/kb/detail.jsp?faqId=1110, which mentions the
standard based on a 6x9 inch print, but not the 11x14 print standard specified for “high precision
mode”. The extrapolation mentioned by the author of the fredmiranda.com article is probably
based on the statement that the higher precision is “up to three times better” in conjunction with
the ratio of the diagonals of the two print sizes.
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to be seen whether it could be encouraged to consistently exceed its specifications,
or whether it was more a matter of luck.
Since most autofocus systems depend critically on detecting contrast, our first
line of investigation was to modify the lighting in order to improve contrast. With
the aid of a light meter, we made several lighting adjustments, the most important
of which was to add considerably more direct lighting. This had the added benefit of
causing the cameras to shoot with a smaller aperture, increasing the typical depth
of field, making sharpness a bit less dependent on the perfection of the autofocus.
As mentioned in section 2.2.1, the lighting change also exacerbated a tendency for
the auto-exposure system to overexpose, so we decided to use the exposure compensation setting to force the cameras to choose exposure settings that matched the
recommendation of our light meter better. These changes did appear to improve
autofocus accuracy quite a bit, so we decided that it was worth making the change
even though it effectively divided our data set into two distinct sets, before and after
the change24 .
Once we had made this change, we began rejecting and re-taking a picture burst
where the focus was not as sharp as it could be, subject to our time constraints. To
be precise, we rejected a burst in pose A if images from any of the three cameras was
not sharp at full frame. In poses B and C, we accepted a burst if only the frontal
view (camera2 for pose B and camera3 for C) was not sharp since this perspective
is redundant with the center camera in pose A. In all frontal views, we accepted
images where the facial area was clear, but the back of the head, particularly the
ears, was not. In the side-view images (camera3 for pose B and camera2 for pose
C), if the ear was clear, but the far edge of the face was not, this was also judged
acceptable. In all cases, we used up all of the allotted time before giving up on an
24

In particular, subject 90 marks the dividing line between the two sets. This subject actually
has a special second session, all taken in pose A, taken under various lighting conditions. Note
that many earlier subjects had repeated sessions that occurred after the lighting change. Which
lighting condition was in effect with each session will be clearly noted when the data is prepared
for distribution.
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optimal set of images across all cameras and poses. However, it was very rare, in
practice, to get optimal results on the first try, so this tended to make the average
session last longer, kept the pace fairly frantic, and was generally more frustrating
for operator and subject. We therefore continued to study the problem further as
time allowed.
We had observed that one of the cameras tended to have trouble more often than
the others, but swapping in another camera body appeared to make no difference, so
we did not suspect a malfunctioning body. We did, however, discover on swapping the
lenses around that the less accurate focus appeared to follow one lens. Replacing that
lens with a new one improved autofocus performance dramatically: we were getting
an accurate focus almost every time with the new lens. Replacing the remaining two
lenses gave us a similar improvement across all three cameras. This improvement,
frustratingly, did not last the duration of the project: the new lenses eventually
started performing no better than the originals. Since we did not think we had
mistreated the lenses in any way, we needed a good explanation in order to justify
continuing to buy new lenses. Another part of the discussion thread we quoted
earlier had an explanation (which we quote again, verbatim, since we don’t think it
can be stated more clearly):
When you half-press the shutter release (or the * button, if you’ve
used the custom function to move focusing control there), the activated
AF sensor “looks” at the image projected by the lens from two different
directions (each line of pixels in the array looks from the opposite direction of the other) and identifies the phase difference of the light from each
direction. In one “look,” it calculates the distance and direction the lens
must be moved to cancel the phase differences. It then commands the
lens to move the appropriate distance and direction and stops. It does
not “hunt” for a best focus, nor does it take a second look after the lens
has moved (it is an “open loop” system).
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If the starting point is so far out of focus that the sensor can’t identify
a phase difference, the camera racks the lens once forward and once
backward to find a detectable difference. If it can’t find a detectable
difference during that motion, it stops.
Although the camera does not take a “second look” to see if the
intended focus has been achieved, the lens does take a “second look” to
ensure it has moved the direction and distance commanded by the camera
(it is a “closed loop” system). This second look corrects for any slippage
or backlash in the lens mechanism, and can often be detected as a small
“correction” movement at the end of the longer initial movements.
Source: User RDKirk at
http://www.fredmiranda.com/forum/topic2/241524
We had observed the lens focus motors sometimes moving rapidly across a small
range, seemingly hunting for a good focus. We had assumed that this was done
under the control of the autofocus system, perhaps in response to ambiguous contrast
information, but according to our source, this behavior is controlled entirely within
the lens25 . Assuming this information is correct, then our degradation in autofocus
performance is likely caused by mechanical wear-and-tear within the lens, which is
very plausible in a gear system that appears to be fabricated in nylon. The gear
system simply meshes better in a new lens than in one that has seen the heavy use
required by our project26 .
We therefore elected to continue replacing the lenses as necessary to complete our
primary data collection work. If we elect to expand this data set in the future, we
25

Again, we are aware of no Canon source that explains how the autofocus system is supposed to
work, and the source we are quoting is one of many third-party sources that describe the lens-camera
interaction as stated in the material we have quoted.
26
We should mention here that we don’t think that there is really anything wrong with our
“used-up” lenses. They continue to function well within Canon’s specifications, and indeed any
photographer doing normal portraiture with these worn lenses would not be unhappy with the
results. Most photographers needing the level of fine detail that we were striving for would simply
manually adjust the focus, which as we explained earlier, was not a possibility for us.
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will investigate whether lenses are available that are constructed with more durable
materials, or we may look for new cameras that can be synchronized in a manual
focus mode.

2.4.2.3

Control Box Malfunctions

After six months of flawless operation, nearing the end of the capture phase of
the project, the camera control box started to malfunction. Specifically, the still
cameras started shooting without the operator pressing the shutter release button.
This started happening quite suddenly, and very frequently: dozens of times over
the course of an hour, making successful completion of a subject session difficult if
not impossible.
With the aid of an oscilloscope, we discovered that these misfires coincided with a
very short (about 500ns) burst of sinusoidal noise in a high frequency band (centered
around 50 MHz) appearing on the ground bus. Sources internal to the box, coming
from the various control lines, or from the power supply were quickly eliminated,
so we concluded that the unwanted AC voltage must be induced by an external
source. Adding additional filter capacitance throughout the circuit greatly reduced
the frequency of the problem, allowing us to quickly resume production work, and
building a well-grounded external shield around the control box eliminated it almost
entirely.
Although we had an effective work-around, we would still have a misfire once or
twice a day, and not having identified the source was, to say the least, intellectually
unsatisfying. After a few weeks of working around the problem, we began to notice
a much greater incidence of shocks from electrostatic discharges into the aluminum
support structure of the camera rig, and further noticed a near exact correlation
between these discharges and the camera misfires. Even discharges barely large
enough to be perceptible seemed to trigger the problem, especially with our RF shield
temporarily removed. Perhaps these discharges had always caused the problem, and
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the earlier discharges were not powerful enough to be so noticeable, making the
relationship less obvious? A little research into the emitted spectrum distribution
of an electrostatic discharge [69, 73] indicated we indeed had a probable cause, and
simply modifying our behavior to be more careful about discharging built-up static
made this problem vanish27 .

27

What about the sudden onset of the problem? The problem coincided with a stretch of cold
weather in Philadelphia, and the operator had started wearing heavier clothing, notably wool socks
and thicker-soled shoes! This change in attire predictably leads to a lot more static shocks.
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Chapter 3
Tracking a Moving Target: Design
and Implementation of a Facial
Imagery Annotation System

3.1

Motivation

Having collected our new set of high-resolution facial images, in order to compare
corresponding facial features, we first need to become considerably more concrete
on what we mean by “facial feature.” In particular, we need to pick a set of facial
regions, each with a specific-as-possible working definition. For example, in order to
compare one right eye to another, one first needs to come up with a rule for where to
draw a boundary line between those pixels that are in the right eye, and those that
are not. We can then mark up the image set, face by face, through a process of hand
annotation. Once we have these annotated images, we can analyze their statistical
variation, identifying which features and which inter-feature geometries objectively
stand out the most in each face.
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As one might imagine, ours is hardly the first serious academic study of anthropometry, or the study of measurements of human anatomy. Perhaps the most wellknown such effort was undertaken in the late 19th century by Alphonse Bertillon,
who made detailed measurements of French prisoners for the purpose of identification, pioneering the first large scale biometric identification system. His system of
measurement [8] was widely used by law enforcement of the period, before the use
of fingerprinting overtook it in popularity [135].
A much more contemporary and very widely-cited effort by Farkas [41] comprises
extensive tables of statistical facial measurements, broken down by age, sex, race,
etc. In order to make use of this statistical catalog for our purposes, we would need to
take measurements that could be directly compared with these tables, i.e. we would
need to use the exact same anatomical markers used by Farkas. Finding many of
these markers, however, indispensably require being able to touch the subject: they
cannot be reliably located in a photograph [25]. Taking the measurements directly
from a live subject would not only be prohibitively expensive, but would require
substantial training from an expert in the field. In any case, since we are interested
specifically in interfering with the operation of face recognition systems that use twodimensional imagery, we are more interested in a set of structures that are visually
apparent in a photograph.

3.2

Pre-processing steps

Instead of relying upon definitions of facial features that a plastic surgeon might
agree with, we are instead taking our inspiration from David Martin’s dissertation
work [84], which relied on the natural intuitions of very lightly trained students in
order to divide photographic scenes into their constituent objects. Although his
annotators were not asked to do so, he found that a subset of them wanted to mark
more than just the boundaries of any humans appearing in the images. In particular,
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they wanted to break down the faces to their constituent parts. For our annotation
effort, we encourage and rely on this tendency, asking our annotators to lean heavily
on their own intuition on how to break down a face into substructures1 .
Since the task of annotating the images of 303 subjects with many anatomical
markers is a large, tedious job, we realized in the very early planning stages that in
order for the task to be completed in a reasonable amount of time, it would need
to be divided up across a group of annotators. This practical necessity gave us the
advantage of being able to obtain a consensus opinion on how to define each facial
features, rather than relying on the opinion of any single person. This is, of course,
also a disadvantage in that there is no guarantee that such a consensus exists. In
order to mitigate this risk, we simply involved a subset of the annotation staff at each
stage of the feature-definition process. We describe this process in the remainder of
this section.
Before any annotation could begin, a single image needed to be selected from the
collection of images we had collected for each subject. For this primary annotation
round, we used only pose A as depicted in figure 2.16, but there could still be up
to 24 such images, depending on how many sessions each subject participated in.
Images were selected primarily according to the quality of their pose with respect to
the alignment markers, as described in section 2.3.3, and additionally according to
the sharpness of the image. A few annotators were hired earlier than the others in
order to complete this task. While they were going through this selection process,
they were asked to also take a look at the most recognizable facial features: the
eyes, the nose, the mouth, and the shape of the head. Having consulted several
anatomical references and other efforts toward measuring facial structures [25, 41,
43, 70, 112, 135], together with the annotators, we considered various anatomical
boundaries connected to each of these core features. We evaluated the difficulty of
1

The reason behind this seemingly instinctive desire to parse faces is interesting in its own right,
but studying this behavior for its own sake it is well beyond the scope of this dissertation. We
speculate that we are tapping into the mental processes that facilitate human recognition of faces,
and there is doubtless extensive relevant research in Cognitive Science on the subject.
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definitively identifying these structures across the entire set of images. For instance,
if one is trying to find the boundaries of an eye, one can consider looking for one of
several structures: the inner or outer limits of the eyelid, the outermost edges of the
orbit (the eye socket), or the orbicularis oculi (the muscles that surround the eye
socket and enable the motion of the eyelids). All of these structures are visible and
we could have chosen to mark the positions of any or all of them. We chose to only
mark the inner edge of the eyelid for this round of annotation simply because it is
the easiest boundary to reliably identify: the contrast of the bright white color of
the of the sclera with the surrounding eyelids make this boundary particularly easy
to define and reliably identify.
Working with a prototype of the project annotation tool, VisageMap, described
in detail in section 3.4.2, we then tried actually marking up each feature according to
our working definitions, refining these definitions further to try to handle ambiguities
or other problems we encountered. For instance, with the eyes, we decided to include
anatomical structures inside the eyelid, including such structures as the lacrimal
caruncle (this fleshy part of the inner corner of the eye), the plica semilunaris, and
other parts of the conjunctiva2 . We also settled on a final name for the feature, eye
opening, to precisely express that we are interested in marking the visible opening
between the eyelids.
In one case, we were not able to come up with a reasonable rule for defining part
of a feature: the topmost point of the nose. Anatomically, there is a clear choice:
the nasion, which is the intersection of the nasal bones and the frontal bone on the
human skull. This is easy to find by touch: there is a very perceptible notch at this
point. However, the soft tissues that cover this part of the skull typically make it
completely invisible on a photograph. We therefore chose a completely arbitrary,
but visible, point to define the top of the nose feature, and during analysis, we will
2

The decision to include all of these structures was primarily to simplify identifying the boundaries of this feature to finding the edges of the eyelid, but this also has the advantage of including
the complete inner corner of the eye, which very obviously has a lot of individual variation in its
shape.
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simply treat thus arbitrary point as having a large measurement error.
Additional refinements to the feature definitions were made during the early
stages of the production work. All such changes were communicated to the annotation staff so that a group consensus was always in force. The final working
definitions are recorded as part of the annotation template, described in more detail
in section 3.4.2, which is itself copied into every completed annotation file as part of
its structured metadata.
In addition to refining our definitions, the raw-format images were additionally
processed with Adobe Photoshop CS3 Extended. The processing steps were as follows (the precise parameters used for each image were recorded as part of the image
metadata):
• The automatic exposure tool for camera raw was used and small hand adjustments were made to optimize facial information. Specifically, exposure was
adjusted to expose as much detail in the shadowed part of the face (usually
the eyes) without blowing out the image highlights (usually on the tip of the
nose) excessively.
• The white balance was adjusted based on the color reference card (when available) or the scale reference card.
• Convert the color profile to the working color space.
• Rotate the images to correct for left↔right head tilt. More precisely, we rotated
the image so that a vertical line bisecting the face was vertical. We used the
ruler tool provided with CS3 Extended to make sure that the bisecting line was
chosen correctly. This rotation of the head within the imaging plane was one
pose factor that we could not reliably control when taking the photographs, so
we elected to correct for it in post-processing as stated.
• Resize the image canvas to 3504 × 2336, the original image resolution. The
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canvas size will have become slightly larger if the image was rotated.
• Convert to a JPEG with no embedded color profile3 at the 94% quality level.

3.3

Requirements

Unfortunately, we were not able to identify an off-the-shelf drawing tool that could
come anywhere close to meeting our needs, so it was necessary to design and develop
an entirely new forensic image annotation and analysis tool suite. In this section,
we discuss some of the design goals that drove our architectural choices in designing
the MASKS annotation software. We begin with a summary of the core qualities
that informed the design process, along with a brief explanation of the intent of
each of these qualities. We then proceed to explain some important highlights of our
implementation in detail.
• Consistent
Since the purpose of this annotation work, for our current research needs, is
to do a statistical comparison of corresponding points across all of the faces
in the data set, the notion of correspondence itself needed to be well-defined.
One way of marking the boundaries of facial features would be to mark the
edges freehand, as if with a pen on a printed photograph. This method could
potentially give us as much resolution in the annotation as there is in the image
itself, but it is not only painstaking, and thus likely time-prohibitive, but it is
not immediately clear how to compare mark-up done in this way. In particular,
once we have marked the full border of a feature, for a given point on one face’s
border, how do we identify the corresponding point on another face? Since the
size of facial features differ, there won’t be any trivial one-to-one mappings
3

Color profiles proved to be a problem for the version of Java2D we were using to render images.
The color profile is embedded in the companion Photoshop-format file, which was also saved for
future reference.
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from one to the other. To impose such a one-to-one correspondence, we simply
need to make sure that we are consistently making the same measurement on
each face, and that the measurement process is reproducible. Since the total
size of the enterprise requires distributing the work more than one individual
annotator, achieving this kind of consistency of measurement is a particular
challenge.

• Reusable
In creating this annotated data set, we are aware of the fact that it will almost
certainly be of interest to other researchers. We are aware of no other face
image sets available for research purposes that are annotated to the extent we
would need, let alone incorporating as many subjects as we have in our set.
Making the data set easy to use outside of the MASKS project was therefore
high on our list of requirements. One important factor toward achieving this
was to choose a file format that is well-documented and easy to interpret, with
or without the tools that we built for our own research needs.

• Extensible
For reasons of time and budget, we will not be able to extract all of the useful
information that our highly detailed images contain. In order to make sure
that none of our effort is wasted, we ideally want to design the annotation
procedure and the storage format so that, not only could we add new features,
but additional resolution could also be added to existing features. We want
to build on the work already done rather than discarding it and starting from
scratch. Accomplishing this goal also yields a side-benefit: we can scale the
resolution and feature set up or down depending on the constraints of our
schedule.
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3.4
3.4.1

Implementation
The MASKS Distributed Annotation Protocol

Once it became clear that the annotation task was much too substantial for one
annotator to complete in a reasonable amount of time, we were faced with some
critical choices with regard to how, exactly, to divide up the work.
Since we ultimately needed to be able to compare each completed annotation file
with every other file, it was of vital importance that the whole set was marked up in
a consistent way. In particular, even though there would be no single annotator that
would mark up all of the faces, we needed to make it extremely probable that, for any
given face, any annotator would make the same choices. As we will describe in the
next section, some of this assurance came with careful design of the interaction in the
relevant portion of the user interface. At least as important, however, was designing
an annotation process that required some sort of consensus among annotators.
We see two broad ways of accomplishing consensus in a collaborative annotation
process. The first is to have two or more annotators work independently, each creating their own version of the annotation. We then merge the resulting annotations.
Where the annotations agree, it is obvious to see how to merge them. But if they
differ, it is hard to see how to decide on the best of two differing annotations. Some
sort of average of two results is unlikely to be the right solution here: if the task is
truly well-defined, it is likely that one of the annotations is simply mistaken, and
averaging would introduce unnecessary error. Another method might be to require
three or perhaps five different independent annotations, and we would resolve conflicts by voting. This method would multiply the man-hours required to complete a
given annotation, and might also simply multiply the disagreement.
Another possibility is to send the disagreement back to the annotators for further
debate, letting them decide themselves what they, as a group, think the correct
answer is. But then why should we start with two or more independent annotations?
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This leads us to the second possibility for collaboration: we have one annotator
complete the annotation, and then send the result to one or more other annotators
for inspection: if the other annotators disagree, they debate the controversial aspects,
adjusting the working file until consensus is reached. It is this method that we
actually implemented. Specifically, the consensus protocol works as follows:
1. A new annotation task is assigned to annotator A.
2. The completed annotation is sent to another annotator B, different from A, for
verification. If annotator B does not agree with the work of A, B may make
changes, and the changed version is sent back to A for re-verification.
3. If at any time A or B does not wish to make any more changes, the verification
cycle is complete, and the annotation gets sent to the supervisor for final
approval.
4. If at any time A and B decide they cannot come to a consensus, they can ask
the supervisor to arbitrate the disagreement4 .
The supervisor is not intended to do any of the annotation work himself, but
rather inspect all of the completed annotations as they come in, and further insure
that the data set was getting consistent mark-up5 . If the supervisor detects some
inconsistency with the rest of the finished annotations, the flaw is noted and the file
is sent back to the annotation staff to be revised6 .
4

This was a very rare occurrence in practice.
For reasons that we will delve into in section 3.5, this became more of a bottleneck for the
process than expected.
6
In one of the reviews of this dissertation, it was pointed out that this protocol design entails
some danger of the reviewers being led down garden paths: an important detail might be missed
because it was not marked at all by annotator A, and B did not notice it because the mark-up
that A did naturally stands out more. The supervisor is burdened with guarding against this in
our protocol as designed. Since the definitions of the features in MASKS were pretty clear-cut
due to their relative coarseness, we don’t think this situation arose in practice. With features that
are more ambiguous in nature, a protocol where two or more independent mark-ups are produced
might be necessary.
5
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3.4.2

The MASKS Software Suite

In this section, some of the software architecture of the MASKS software suite is explained in detail, focusing primarily on the annotation tool VisageMap. We highlight
the design decisions that were critical to the success of the project, particularly those
decisions that implement the design goals described in section 3.3. We also endeavor
to provide enough explanation for other researchers to make use of the MASKS data
set for their own work.
3.4.2.1

The MASKS Annotation File Format

As explained in section 3.3, since this annotated data set required such a large upfront investment, it is important to us that it remains a useful artifact to the research
community long after the MASKS project concludes. In order for others to be able
to use it, the choice of storage format was vital: minimally, the format needed to be
easy to understand, and ideally would not of necessity require our software in order
to even start working with the data. The easiest way we could think of accomplishing
this was to adopt an existing, open data format. Happily, just such a format was
available, namely SVG: Scalable Vector Graphics[29]. SVG is a specification that
allows combining text, raster images and a rich set of vector graphical objects into
an XML file [27]. Our annotations have a natural encoding in SVG: a raster image
background consisting of our facial images, with sets of points overlaying the image
which mark the borders of particular regions in the image. These border points
are naturally represented as vector polygons, which have the desirable property of
scale independence: no matter how we scale the image, the polygons lie at the same
relative position on the face.
The SVG standard is also flexible enough that we can encode any special metadata required by our own tools without interfering with the ability of other software
that support SVG from rendering our files7 . Furthermore, XML parsers are available
7

Notable examples of software that can read SVG include Adobe Illustrator, Microsoft Visio,
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for just about any programming language one might care to use, so the raw data is
easily accessible if one does not really need visual rendering capabilities8 .
To be more precise, a MASKS annotation file consists of an SVG document
with a particular structure, including special elements and attributes specific to the
MASKS layering namespace9 . Note that this means that although every MASKS
annotation file is a valid SVG document, most SVG documents are not valid MASKS
annotation files. For reference, a sample annotation file is included as appendix A.
A MASKS annotation file is further composed of layered graphical objects. Each
logical layer is encapsulated in an SVG g element, whose purpose is simply to group
together other objects. Each group element that is to be treated as a MASKS layer
has the attribute masks:groupmode with value layer. The lowest layer in the stack,
the one rendered behind all of the others, is the image layer, which contains a link
to the raster image file containing a facial image sample for a given subject. The
resolution of the entire document is sized to exactly match the resolution of the
raster image

10

.

Each subsequent layer is intended to hold the information pertaining to a single
facial feature. In particular, it contains one or more vector graphics objects that
represent the boundaries of the feature. The MASKS file format is designed to be
flexible on the composition of these vector objects, but at this time, the software
assumes that there are exactly two objects: an SVG rect representing a tight,
vertically-aligned bounding box on the feature, and a polygon whose vertices mark
a subset of the perimeter of the feature. Each of these graphical objects are tagged
and the popular Firefox web browser, along with several open source imaging applications.
8
If one was inclined to do so, since XML is fundamentally lightly-structured plain text, one
could extract the data of interest with text processing tools like awk or grep.
9
The
MASKS
namespace
is
formally
identified
by
the
URI
http://nonsense.cis.upenn.edu/namespaces/masks and conventionally identifies its elements and attributes with the prefix masks:, though the standard requires that these prefixes
be changeable. A full explanation of namespaces in XML is beyond the scope of the current
document, but see, for example, [28].
10
Making the resolutions match made certain early implementation work for VisageMap easier.
This assumption could be removed with a little work, but it is probably simpler to just pre-process
the photographs, cropping or adding an empty border, as desired.
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Figure 3.1: A sample of an annotated image, as rendered in the main display window
of VisageMap. It has been cropped to show only the annotated part of the image.
Note that the vertices of each polygon comprise the annotation data, not the line
segments. The line segments are a useful visualization of the error resulting from
under-sampling imposed by the current point quota. This is particularly obvious on
the inner corner of the left eye in this example.
with MASKS attributes that identify their function11 . A sample image showing these
shapes, as rendered by VisageMap, is shown in figure 3.1. Each layer also contains
various textual entities, including identifiers for respective machine- and humanlabeling of each layer, a short paragraph defining what is and is not supposed to
be included in the feature, and annotator comments pertaining specifically to that
feature.
There are many more attributes that form the dialect of SVG we use to encode our
11

Specifically, they both have the attribute masks:shapetype with value bbox for bounding boxes
and segment for the perimeter points.
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MASKS annotation files. Many of these have to do with enforcing the mechanics of
the MASKS annotation protocol and the precise methods used to constrain boundary
points. We will cover much of this ground in the remainder of this section; anything
not explicitly mentioned here is fully explained in the documentation and source code
of the software libraries that underlie VisageMap and the rest of the MASKS software
suite. For researchers and developers interested in decoding MASKS annotation files,
we recommend starting with the overview of the MASKS software suite provided in
appendix B.

3.4.2.2

Maintaining Consistency

We are marking the boundaries of facial features in this data set with a very specific
goal: we want to recover geometrical information about the size, shape, and relative
position of these features for comparison across the whole data set. In order to be able
to make these comparisons, it is vitally important that we make our measurements
in a rigidly consistent way. In order to meaningfully compare a measurement with
another measurement, in addition to using compatible instruments (e.g. rulers with
a standard scale), we must ensure that we have agreed to take our measurements
in the same way. For example, if we want to measure the size of a square with
a ruler, we could measure the width of one side or, unconventionally, measure the
width of a diagonal. Both sufficient to fully specify size of the square, but since
the measurements are not taken in the same way, they are not directly comparable.
A less contrived example is measuring the fuel economy of a car for comparison
with other cars: merely measuring how far the car can drive on a gallon of fuel
is not sufficient to ensure a meaningful comparison: the driving conditions must
also be consistent across the tests. Measurement protocols must be well-defined
and sufficient experimental controls have to be present to guarantee fairness and
reproducibility.
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Since the annotators would all be using the same annotation software, we obviously know that they will be using equivalent measurement devices. Making sure
that they are employing these measurement devices in the exactly the same way,
however, is not nearly so obvious.
Whether the instrument is a real-world device or implemented in software, the
easiest way to make sure that it is used in the right way is to make it as simple as
possible. For instance, as long as you agree on the two points you want to measure,
with minimal training, a ruler is difficult to use incorrectly. You line up to ruler
with the points of interest and read off the marks that lie in between. Calipers are
similarly easy to use: once you decide what the two point of interest are, you adjust
the hinge or slider on the calipers to line up with the points in question, and read
off the tick marks.
We would like our base measurement tool to be as easy to use as calipers. Most
GUI toolkits offer a slider widget: a control, usually called a thumb, that is constrained to move only along a line, often only a horizontal line. If one had a slider
with two thumbs, and one could position the constraint line to pass through the
points of interest, one would have something very much like a caliper. This is the
kernel of our implementation of a point-placement widget.
Once one decides to implement a virtual caliper, one still needs to decide what
points should be measured: we still need some notion of corresponding points in
order to make the same measurements on each face. One way of deriving such a welldefined notion of correspondence is to consider the idea of printing each photograph
on transparency material, something like an oversized photographic slide. Say we
would like to compare the mouths of the two subjects by laying one slide on top of
the other on top of a light table. How do we line up the images so that we can easily
see the differences in size and shape between the two mouths? One way is to line
up their left edges: this would clearly illustrate how the mouths differ in width. We
could similarly see the height difference by lining up the top edges. If we line them
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up at their geometric centers, however, we can see both of the size differences at
once, and more. The near symmetry about the horizontal and vertical lines passing
through the center make it a very natural alignment point for comparison. If we want
to make measurements of the differences between the two photos using calipers, we
can always use the center as one of the points of comparison, fixing one leg of the
caliper there. We’ve reduced the degrees of freedom for a measurements to just two:
the angle of the calipers from a reference axis (say the vertical), and the spread-width
of the calipers. An illustration of this idea is shown in figure 3.2.

Figure 3.2: An illustration of the virtual caliper concept. The red arrows indicate
the position of the caliper tips, one of which is fixed at the geometric center of the
eye. The calipers may be rotated to any angle where a measurement is desired.
Once we have chosen to fix a single point of comparison for each feature, this
point is naturally interpreted as the origin of a planar coordinate system. More
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precisely, it is a simply a standard polar coordinate system, with an independent
origin for each feature12 . Note also that since one end of our virtual calipers is fixed,
we now only need a one-thumbed slider in our GUI implementation. The appearance
of the final editing interface is illustrated in figure 3.3. The red element in the larger
image window is the active slider thumb, and the thin, pale line that passes through
it is the constraint axis that the slider is allowed to move along. The thumb may
be repositioned by dragging it with the mouse, or with various keyboard controls.
The small yellow triangles indicate the positions where other sliders are currently
available to edit a boundary point. The active slider can be chosen by clicking on
the triangles or via keyboard controls. The grid tool, which is typically not turned
on in editing mode in order to reduce interface clutter, is shown enabled for this
illustration in order to show the precise location of the origin (which lies at the
intersection of the blue lines).
The angular positions where a slider is available are not actually chosen by the
annotator: as can be seen in the figure, only eight evenly spaced points are available
in the state shown in the window. In the point generation mode used for this project,
the annotators cannot choose where these points are placed: the angles of the virtual
calipers are drawn from a predictable sequence. We will have more to say about
the details of point generation in the next section. For the present discussion, it
suffices to point out that since the annotator does not choose the angular position of
measurement, their task is very simple indeed: they need only adjust the boundary
point radially until it lies at the boundary of the feature. More precisely, they move
the slider until its tip coincides with a point where the constraint line intersects the
feature boundary13 .
12

To comply with the SVG format, the polygon elements that encode each set of boundary
points are in the cartesian user coordinate system dictated by the standard, which has its origin
in the upper-left portion of the image. For simplicity of internal representation, angles follow
the orientation of the SVG coordinate system and the Java2D graphics library. Converting to
conventional polar coordinates with our origin is a trivial calculation.
13
In the vast majority of cases, the constraint line intersects the feature at exactly one point. If
there was more than one intersection point, the annotators were instructed to choose the outermost

76

Figure 3.3: A screen capture of the layer editing window in VisageMap. The red
GUI element is the active slider. The grid is shown to illustrate the center of the
coordinate system - it can be shown or hidden at the annotator’s discretion.
For a given boundary point, then, the editing process allows only one degree of
freedom: the radial position along the constraint line. We claim that by strictly regimenting the process in this way, consistent results across annotators and across the
data set are easy to obtain. Any disagreement among annotators should be isolated
to the nature of the data: they may not agree where the boundaries of a given facial
feature lie, but once they have reached agreement on how to interpret the image, how
to mark the agreed boundary should be uncontroversial. There is one correct placement for each slider, not many. Analysis is similarly simplified: since the constraint
angles are not under annotator control, they just define correspondence rather than
being data themselves. That is, matching angles define matching boundary points;
the measurements to compare are the radii. These may be directly compared: no
point. Where are there no intersection points, the point is discarded.
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interpolation is required.

3.4.2.3

Building a Good Foundation

One major problem with marking up images as detailed as ours is that we did not
have sufficient resources to make our initial round of annotation just as detailed
as the images themselves. In particular, we would have to use a lower resolution
for our mark-up than the full resolution of the image. However, it is not, a priori,
any more obvious how much resolution is enough for a given feature than which
features to choose in the first place. We therefore made it a core design goal that
our sampling resolution be extensible. That is, we should be able to choose a low
sampling resolution to start with, and be able to ramp up the resolution later if we
deem it desirable or necessary, strictly adding on to existing work, never throwing
it away. This must be done in such a way that we maintain comparability: if one
photo has a higher mark-up resolution than another, we still would like to be able
to compare all of the points in the lower-resolution mark-up to the corresponding
points in the higher-resolution mark-up. Note that this kind of extensibility is also
a useful property for reusability: if another researcher needs additional resolution in
a given feature, they can get where they need to be a lot quicker by building it on
top of the foundation that we provide.
As we mentioned in the previous section, the set of angles that our virtual calipers
may be oriented in are not under the direct control of the annotators. The angles
are instead chosen ahead of time, and the same angle sequence is used for every
face so that we end up with comparable measurements. Achieving the extensibility
property when we have pre-chosen the measurement angles is really pretty easy: we
just divide the desired set of angles into disjoint sets, call them levels, and impose a
total order on these sets. That is, these sets of angles get added to the annotation in
a proscribed sequence. The disjointness and total ordering are, strictly speaking, all
that is needed to get the extensibility we desire. There are, however, some implied
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conditions on this sequence of levels that we’re not yet addressing. The spread of
angles selected for any given mark-up resolution should try to sample the feature
as thoroughly as possible. That is, it should be an informative sample for that
resolution. There should also be a good reason to add the next set of points: adding
another level should add more information. To achieve this, the scheme we have
devised imposes two more simple properties. We will add angles of measurement in
a strict sequence of levels, Li , such that:
Let P =

Si

j=0

Lj . Then:

1. |Li+1 | = |P |
2. ∀θ ∈ Li , ∃φ, ψ ∈ P : φ < θ < ψ and ¬∃ω ∈ P : φ < ω < ψ
Less formally, adding a level adds as many points as we already had in the annotation,
and new angles are chosen to lie between adjacent pairs of existing angles. The idea
is to spread out the set of angles across the whole perimeter of the feature, doubling
the resolution with each additional level.
Once we choose L0 , our zeroth level of points, there are still infinitely many
disjoint angle sets that have the desired properties. We decided on the simplest
choice: we spaced them equally around the circle. More precisely, if are aiming for a
sampling resolution of k points at the feature boundary, we chose to draw our angles
from the sets Φ(k) that have the following generating property

14

:

Φ(k) = { 2πi
: 0 ≤ i < k}
k
For implementation reasons, we chose a k that was always a power of two. We define
our production angle sequence recursively as follows:
1. L0 = Φ(2)
2. Li = Φ(2i+1 ) − Li−1
14

The angles are measured in radians and are measured from a vertical reference axis rather than
the conventional horizontal.

79

In other words, we start with polar angles pointing straight up and down: 0 and
π. We then add angles in layers, choosing each new angle to lie precisely halfway
between two of the angles added in previous layer:

π
2

and

3π
,
2

then angles at quarter-π

intervals, and so on. We refer to this angle sequence as isoangle.
Referring back to figure 3.3, the editing interface is currently showing level 3,
consisting of 8 boundary points. To get to this stage of the editing process, the
annotator first establishes the center of the coordinate system using a center-finding
tool. The use of this tool involves simple placement of a bounding box: a box whose
top coincides with the topmost point in the feature, whose right side coincides with
the rightmost point, and so on. Since the center is common to the constraint lines
associated with every single boundary point, it is absolutely vital that this task
is done correctly15 . Next, level 0 of boundary points is added, which consists of
two points, both with a vertical constraint line. They are adjusted to their correct
position with respect to the feature boundaries. The process continues with level 1,
where two points with horizontal constraints are added and placed. We now have 4
points total. An additional 4 points are added and moved into place next in level
2, and finally we arrive at the 8 points we see in the screen capture at level 3. If
mistakes are detected at earlier levels, there are facilities for stepping back through
the layer addition process to make changes, as well as limited undo support if too
many point levels are removed inadvertently.
Before closing this section, we note that the isoangle sequence, and indeed any
fixed sequence of angles, necessarily constrains the space of polygonal geometry that
our tool can generate. This means that there are certain geometries that our tool
will fit poorly16 . We assert that constraining the degrees of freedom as we have done
here is completely necessary to achieve the consistency this project requires, but
15

As an additional check that the box is placed correctly, the tool will not allow border points to
be positioned outside of the confines of the box. If an annotator decides that a border point really
needs to be outside the box, they know the box was not positioned right in the first place.
16
Large concave curvature, such as occurs on the underside of the eyebrow, is a particular problem
for isoangle mode.
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isoangle is certainly not the only reasonable constraint scheme. We have built the
necessary expressiveness into our SVG dialect to allow more constraint schema to be
added in the future: schema can be chosen independently for each layer if needed.
Some possibilities are mentioned in the documentation for the relevant modules,
though none are fully implemented at this writing17 . We found that isoangle was
sufficient for the features we were interested in for the current project, but certainly
if the facilities that VisageMap were reused for forensic analysis of non-face images,
additional point generation modes would almost certainly be needed.

3.4.2.4

Annotation Templates

Rather than allowing complete latitude for the annotators in deciding how many
levels of border points to use for a given feature, a minimum quota for point count
is set for each feature in the current template file, the skeletal MASKS SVG file
each annotation is based on. Imposing this minimum insures that we will be able
to compare the entire image set at a sampling resolution of our choosing. The
annotators can add more levels than the minimum, and due to the predictability
of the boundary points that we describe in the previous section, comparing higherresolution objects to lower is always well-defined. However, in order to make the
workload of each annotation task more predictable, they are encouraged to stick to
the quota as much as possible.
In addition to the point quotas, the template defines the layers themselves: the
XML entities that define a featural layer, as described in section 3.4.2.1. This includes all labels and the description of what the layer in question is intended to
encompass.
At any time in the annotation process, the master template may be changed
17

There is one additional scheme, orthogonal that is extremely close to a full implementation.
This scheme is designed to converge to complex shapes much more quickly than isoangle, but it
is a poor choice for comparing related objects as we are in this project. It would be a good choice,
however, for tackling an arbitrary scene segmentation project [84]
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in order to increase the point quota for any layer, or to add additional layers. All
subsequent new annotations will proceed incorporating the changes, and any finished
annotations put back into circulation will be updated accordingly. This means that
the scope of the annotation task is never set in stone: it can be adjusted again and
again as the needs of the project evolve. For instance, one can decide to deliberately
undershoot the expected resolution for a given feature, getting back low-resolution
data relatively quickly so that analysis can begin more quickly, and the need for
greater resolution can be evaluated empirically. It is also useful for adjusting the
total workload to fit the budget when the size of the workload is not known ahead
of time (which is actually the reason we included this functionality for MASKS)18 .
The templates are generated using a companion tool, VisageTemplate. In order
to make sure that their models of what constitutes a well-formed MASKS SVG file,
VisageTemplate shares the core library code with VisageMap where the relevant
definitions are encoded. It is not nearly as refined a tool as VisageMap, but it does
offer a form-based tool for setting the parameters of new feature layers, as well a
basic XML editor, which includes such niceties as syntax coloring and a syntactic
correctness checker.

3.4.2.5

Annotation-Aid Grab-Bag

In this section, we briefly describe some of the other pieces that went into the construction of VisageMap, but were of a less fundamental nature than those discussed
earlier in this chapter.

Dual Display and Translucent Overlay As should be very obvious in figures 3.4
and 3.3, there are two copies of the photographic region that is under consideration,
and large parts of these images have a translucent green tinge. The idea of the dual
18

The template merge logic is isolated to a single class file MasksTemplateMerge in the
VisageLayer module. Customizing this facility for the needs of another project would be pretty
trivial.
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Figure 3.4: Displaying the lips in an editor window set to inspection mode
display is to compensate for the fact that no matter hard we worked to make the
editing controls unobtrusive, some of the image would necessarily be obscured. In
addition to the primary image display, we have the small secondary display, which
has all of its indicators drawn on the opposite side of the current feature boundary.
This positioning of the secondary display is driven by the position of the mouse
cursor (or the position of the active control if the keyboard is being used). The two
displays together allow the annotator to see every pixel in the photograph without
adornment. The smaller display has very limited adornment in any case: only a red
indicator that shows where the currently-selected border point control is.
The translucent overlay is based on a similar idea from the annotation tool David
Martin designed for his thesis work [84]. It gives the viewer an unambiguous visualization of what is and is not inside the polygon that represents the current set of
border points. This tells us how accurate the fit is at the current resolution, telling
us at a glance whether we need more border points to capture the shape we are
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working on. As with the other indicators, the overlay is drawn on the opposite side
of the border in the secondary display as in the primary.

Inspection Mode In figure 3.4, we give an example of an editor window set to
inspection mode. This mode is designed to aid annotators in checking each other’s
work during the verification process. During an assigned verification task, editing
windows come up in inspection mode by default. Annotators may also enable this
mode whenever they wish in order to see what the verifying annotator will see.
The visualization is similar to the regular editing mode, but differs in a few key
ways:
• All editing controls, including mouse interactions, are disabled. This is order
to prevent unintended editing.
• Graphical editing elements, such as the slider thumb and the constraint lines,
are not shown in this mode in order to de-clutter the display so that the
underlying photographic details may be seen more easily.
• Yellow triangles are drawn to indicate the positions of all border points instead
of just the current level of editable boundary points.
• If the grid tool is turned on, the green overlay is redrawn to show the position
of the bounding box than defines the alignment point for comparison across
the image set.

Version Control No version of a given annotation file that gets submitted to the
MASKS server is ever discarded. Each change is stored efficiently in the back-end
database of a Subversion [133] repository. As part of the verification process, an annotator is able to request any revision of any annotation file, allowing a side-by-side
comparison. Each submission requires a textual comment intended to summarize
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what they have changed and why, and the complete history of these revision comments are displayed by default with any verification assignment.
The Annotation Task Server Having determined that the annotation task has
to be distributed, it made sense to construct the software architecture using a classic
client-server model: rich clients where the annotation work takes place, and a server
that keep track of the state of the overall annotation project state, assigning tasks
to individual annotators as required. The task server, which is described further in
appendix B, maintains a central database which tracks the progress of each image
file through the annotation process, including which annotators have worked on it,
which template version was used for the latest submission, and various timestamps
on state changes. It also tracks what is assigned to particular annotators at any
given time, and enforces the strictures of the MASKS annotation protocol.

Figure 3.5: The main window with some features rendered and others not, and
illustrating annotation status.

The Main Window and Layer Navigator In figure 3.5, we show the typical
layout of the main window. With this screen capture, we are intending to illustrate
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that arbitrary subsets of boundary points may be shown for simultaneous inspection:
the layer navigation tool is what allows us to do this. In addition, it uses color to
tell the annotator, at a glance, their progress on the current annotation task: green
for layers that have met their point quota, red for those that have not, and black for
optional layers19 . Bounding boxes that have no accompanying boundary points are
drawn in red in the main display window20 .

3.4.2.6

Practical Matters

In addition to the core design principles laid out in section 3.3, there were a number
of practical considerations contributing to the final implementation.
Since our budget for completing the annotation project was quite limited, in order
to increase the appeal of a modest hourly wage, it was desirable to accommodate
allowing the annotators to work where they liked, keeping whatever work hours
were convenient for them. Instead of asking them to come use specially prepared
laboratory computers, then, we elected to make the client usable on personal home
computers. This design goal necessarily required targeting more than one computing
platform, so to aid rapid development, we selected the Java programming language
with its Swing GUI toolkit. This toolkit allows the creation of a single graphical
user interface that runs on any platform that has a native Java Virtual Machine,
while still maintaining something of the native look-and-feel of the host platform if
desired21 .
19

A layer is marked optional for annotation purposes if it is simply not expected to be found
in every face. An example of this for faces might be a facial tattoo. We definitely do want such
relatively rare features marked if they are present.
20
For most features, bounding boxes, though present, are not normally drawn for a finished
feature. The exception is if only a boundary box was required in the first place: a template may
specify a bounding-box-only requirement by specifying a point quota of zero.
21
Specifically, we built the application on top of NetBeans Platform version 5.5, which allows
the creation of new applications, reusing some sophisticated components from the NetBeans IDE.
This facility was not well documented at the time, but we were able to obtain a pre-release copy
of a book [14] on the subject, which was invaluable. This toolkit also includes a very advanced
Swing GUI construction tool, which unquestionably saved considerable time compared with the
alternative of a completely hand-coded GUI.
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Also contributing to the choice of Java as a development platform was the availability of Apache Batik [138], an open source library for the creation and manipulation of SVG graphical objects. There does not appear to be anything comparable
available targeting another language. The main image viewer, the SVG parser, and
the serialization code relies heavily upon Batik.

3.5

Lessons Learned

For the most part, the annotation process ran its course as planned. There were, of
course, some observations made along the way that might have improved the process.
We close this chapter by offering these insights to anyone interested in building on
our work.

3.5.1

Difference Visualization

One way in which significant annotation time was wasted was two annotators would
sometimes get stuck in a kind of hysteresis, undoing and redoing each other’s work on
the same feature, cycling between repeating sequences of almost identical candidate
mark-ups. Comparing the differences in the raw annotation files made this obvious,
but VisageMap has no internal facility for doing this, and such a facility would not be
very informative to most annotators in any case. If they had a better way to visualize
the differences between two or more annotations, we believe that they would be able
to get a better intuition for the precise locus of their disagreement, and converge
more quickly (or else conclude more quickly that they would never converge). Had
we the resources to implement it, we believe devising a tool to visually illustrate
the differences between two candidate mark-ups in a single window would yield
a significant efficiency boost. This might have been as simple as rendering the
polygons of each set of border points in different colors. If there were irreconcilable
differences of opinion between the two annotators, the tool would also be useful for
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the annotation supervisor to make a judgment one way or the other22 .

3.5.2

Distributing the Supervisory Role

There were many times during the course of the process where the author of this
dissertation, in the role of the annotation supervisor, became a bottleneck on the
annotation process. As the annotation staff grew larger, more annotations were
completed on a given day. Without the annotation supervisor staying on top of
quality control, some of the work started to get a sloppy, as can happen with any
repetitive task. Offering specific, concrete feedback almost always improved quality,
but doing so was very time-consuming, and could not be maintained in practice. In
the end, the feedback was necessarily reduced to simply removing inaccurate data
points and asking that they be redone.
There were particular members of the annotation staff who had a better handle
on the bigger picture than others, and it might have helped if the annotation protocol could take differing skill levels into account, promoting some annotators into
a more supervisory role. If the task of providing good constructive criticism to less
experienced annotators could be made more efficient, the proficiency of the whole
group might have been raised.

3.5.3

User Interface Refinements

There were several areas where the annotators could, and did, provide constructive
criticism to the author of VisageMap. The following are some elements that could
use further refinement:
• Most annotators agreed that the green overlay was useful for verification, but
22

Implementing this difference visualization feature would make a hybrid annotation protocol
practical: two annotators produce independent annotations, and both of them get a visualization
of the differences between the two, and attempt to come to a consensus as before. Such a hybrid
design would be advisable for annotation tasks where there is more room for different interpretations
of the data.
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thought it was distracting during the live editing process. A control should
be added to turn it on or off on command. It would also be a good idea to
add controls to change the color and opacity of the overlay - some annotators
thought the precise color choice interacted with the skin tones of some of the
photographic subjects in an unhelpful way.
• The annotators almost universally dislike how the interaction with the bounding box tool works. As implemented, it allows changing the size of the box
without changing the center (by causing all resizing operations to be axially
symmetric). This was intended to emphasize the center-finding purpose of the
tool, but most annotators did not find this helpful, and would have preferred
a more conventional box-drawing interaction.
• The editing window needs to support zooming the image. As can be seen
in the screen captures, there is a widget in the GUI for doing this, but it is
currently disabled. Adding this feature is a lot more work than the equivalent
functionality implemented in the main image window. This is because the
necessary coordinate transformations are more complicated than expected due
to some oddities in how affine transforms are done in the graphics toolkit
underlying the message window23 .
• As shown in chapter 2, for each image we have chosen for annotation, two
more simultaneously-captured still images were taken, each with a different
perspective of the subject. There were some cases where it was difficult to
tell whether a texture patch was telling us something about the subject’s face,
or whether it was simply a misleading shadow cast by another object in the
environment. If we had implemented a facility for bringing the alternative
camera views into consideration, these ambiguous cases might have been easily
settled.
23

In particular, Java2D transforms screen coordinates to image coordinates automatically in some
methods, but not all of them, and which methods are which is not documented.
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• Rather than have a concept of optional features in the template, i.e. features
that are not expected to occur in every face, such as scars and tattoos, it would
more natural to allow the annotators to insert such features as needed. This
could be done with relatively little work by repurposing some of the machinery
implemented in VisageTemplate to this task.
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Chapter 4
Broader Notions: Disinformation
Theory
4.1

Re-thinking Noisy Communication Channels

In the next chapter, we describe our methodology for analyzing our annotated imagery and how we think it relates to disguising the identity of our participants. Before
we delve into those details, we pause in this chapter to consider a generalization of
the problem we are trying to solve. We are trying to prevent or at least frustrate
the automatic identification of human faces in digital imagery. The machinery we
have built to chip away at this problem is composed of an enormous number of small
but important details, so many that the way forward was not always clear. In order
to better isolate some of the dimensions of the problem, it was sometimes useful
to abstract many of these details away. This chapter develops this abstraction into
disinformation theory, a simplified and generalized notion of communication that
is intended to be, in some way, misleading or deceptive.
We coined this term in homage to Shannon’s information theory [121], whose
simple, but powerful, model of a communication system was very influential in our
development of a theory of how one might prevent communication. We reproduce the
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Figure 4.1: Shannon’s Model of a General Communication System
diagram that begins his seminal contribution in figure 4.1. A message is intended
to be transmitted accurately over a noisy communication channel, and Shannon
develops mathematics to characterize the limits of that channel and how to efficiently
and effectively communicate over that channel despite its limits.
There is an implicit assumption of cooperation between the sender and receiver
in this model as Shannon intended it. In the real world, however, not every communication is a cooperative act: information can be unwittingly transmitted to be
eavesdropped by someone we did not intend. The model depicted in figure 4.1 can be
reinterpreted to capture this case: we simply assume the transmission is not entirely
within the control of the owner of the message, and the owner of the receiver has
his own motives that may not be very compatible with our own. We consider what
countermeasures that the model offers given this situation: if we can’t completely
prevent the transmission, is there something we can do so that the message is received with some of its content missing? Or might we distort it enough that it is
hard to recover or, better yet, it is entirely misleading? In addition to the biometric
instantiation of this problem that we are focused on for the current study, such a
model is applicable to many other problems: cryptographic communications, signals
intelligence, physical camouflage, or even poker games. In each case there is information transmission that is not desired: you have an adversary that you don’t want
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figuring out how to interpret the transmission correctly. How can you manipulate
the situation to your advantage?
We assume, for this discussion, that although we might be able to manipulate
other parts of the abstract communication model, we have absolutely no direct control over the receiver: whatever information makes it through the channel, our adversary is free to interpret as he wishes. That is not to say that there are no useful
suppositions that we can make about how the adversary does his work. We can
assume, without loss of generality, that the adversary will have a probabilistic model
which maps the received signal to all of the possible messages he thinks can receive
on the given communication channel. Given a new message, he will measure it according to the parameters of his model, trying to find the most likely match in his
model given what he has learned from the message.
We assume for the remainder of the chapter that we and our adversary both have
an equal understanding of how to interpret a given message. That is, the encoding of
the message is well-defined and known to both parties. That is, if both parties read
the message together, both would agree what it says. Crucially, we do not assume
that either or both parties believe that the content of the message is accurate. To be
more precise, we know which messages we have interfered with and to what extent we
have done so, and the adversary may or may not take into account that interference
with the communications channel is possible.
Ideally, we would like to mislead the adversary into believing that he has received
a message that differs from reality. In order to do a good job of this, we will have
to credibly estimate what the adversary’s model might look like. If we assume, for
illustrative purposes, that we think that the adversary’s model has an important
two-dimensional subspace, it might be represented graphically something like figure
4.2. Each ellipsoid shape delimits the boundaries of a single message, including all
possible ways of expressing it. The adversary will map the signal he receives as
a point in the model, and interpret it according to the bubble that the message
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falls inside1 . Messages are close together in the model if they have similar content.
Spaces that are not occupied by messages are allowed by the message encoding, but
are excluded from the model for domain-specific semantic reasons: they do not make
sense or are excluded by accepted facts. In this example, the correct answer, which
we don’t want him to know, is inside the shape marked with an asterisk. Our goal
is to do our best to ensure that he cannot place the message in the right spot: we
must either deprive him of enough information to pick out any one message, or find
a means of modifying the message so that he will map it to the wrong point.
In order to effectively deceive our adversary with a modified transmission, not
just any modification will do. Minimally, the received message must still be valid,
meaning it must map to one or more members of the set of possible messages. In
addition, the received message must be plausible: we must have good reason to
believe that if our adversary interprets the falsified message as we intend, he won’t
disregard it because he too believes it to be false. One part of overcoming this
obstacle is to minimize any overt signs of tampering. A much, much harder part of
this task is framed well by the following frequently-cited passage from the The Art
of War by Sun Tzu:
Know the enemy and know yourself; in a hundred battles you will never
be in peril. When you are ignorant of the enemy, but know yourself, your
chances of winning or losing are equal. If ignorant both of your enemy
and yourself, you are certain in every battle to be in peril.
No matter how sophisticated a theory we develop, there is no substitute for the
hard work of gathering all of the knowledge we can about our adversary: we are, after
all, trying to guess how he thinks. We find it useful, therefore, to reason about the
model in figure 4.2 as if it its topology is influenced by our domain-specific knowledge
1

This particular 2D model was constructed to have a variety of topological densities, but other
than that, the details have no particular significance. We are using a concrete example to illustrate the strategies that we might use if this was based upon our best estimate of the adversary’s
knowledge base.
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Figure 4.2: An illustration of an adversary attempting to classify our modified transmission using a 2-dimensional slice of some larger model. Each elliptical region is the
subspace occupied by one message. The correct message is the circle marked with
an asterisk. The dotted line indicates how aggressive noise-injection might affect his
model. The letters indicate various strategies for disinformation, which we explain
in detail in the chapter text.
of the adversary at least as much as the physical constraints of the communication
channel itself. We will articulate more about how this might work in the remainder
of this chapter in the context of a running example, introduced in the next section.

4.2

The Saboteur

In trying to de-identify faces, we are really facing two major problems. The first is
the problem of understanding the nature of the information in the first place. Both
we and, we presume, our adversaries are lacking in some basic knowledge about
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where in the face we should look for the most informative identifying information,
and how it adds up to a unique appearance for each person. Establishing a baseline
for answering this question is what we are addressing in the bulk of the apparatus
of this dissertation 2 .
In this chapter only, we put aside the question of properly modeling how the
message is encoded to consider the second half of the problem: even if we fully
understand the information content of the message, do we know how to disrupt it?
In order to get better clarity on this question, we also put aside faces in favor of a
simpler working problem.
Imagine that there is a war underway, one that is geographically distributed over
a large area, but in a pre-radio era. In order to conduct the war, there needs to be
communication among far-flung commanders. The state-of-the-art communication
technology is written communiqués in plain text on paper, which are carried between
the communicating parties by trusted courier. The messages are authenticated with
a set of closely-held paper embossers3 . You are a undercover spy whose task it is to
limit the effectiveness of that communication, preferably without arousing too much
suspicion: you want to disrupt as many messages as possible without being caught.
For instance, a series of messages that go entirely missing, while completely effective
on a per-message basis, is likely to attract unwanted attention rather quickly.
In terms of Shannon’s model, we define the communications medium to be the
typewritten message as carried by the courier. The transmitter includes the chain
of people that convey the message verbally and the process of encoding the message
2

Our research and that of others indicate that a good analogy might be that the identity of a
person is encoded as many ”words”. These words are encrypted using flawed ciphers of various
strengths. If you can break the encryption on enough of the words, you can recover the identity.
These words are redundant, so many subsets of the words are sufficient for identification. For
instance, if you have a detailed-enough photograph, some research results indicate some skin texture
patches are as unique as the macroscopic features. We improve our sensing technology and our
knowledge over time and are gradually breaking more and more layers of encryption.
3
This somewhat contrived problem is meant to be more explanatory than realistic. We are
well aware that more or less effective cryptographic techniques have been available throughout the
history of warfare.
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Figure 4.3: Our paper-channel message in its original, not-tampered-with form.
onto paper with a typewriter. Once it has left the typewriter, we say that it has
been transmitted. Once it had been transmitted, there are opportunities to degrade
or modify the content by injecting noise into the communication medium4 .
We discount manipulating the courier in any way due to high risk of detection,
and instead focus on the vulnerabilities of the paper component of the medium. What
tools do we have available in terms of the model? If we assume, as stated earlier,
that we do not have control over the receiving apparatus, that leaves the transmitter
and the noise source. In both cases, what we want to do is take full advantage of our
knowledge of the limits of the communication medium, overwhelming the theoretical
4

One could make a compelling argument for making a different assignment of the parts of the
communication system to the components the abstract channel - we are making a specific choice
for clarity of discussion.
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capacity of the channel so that information actually gets lost or, better yet, looks like
it has entirely different content than intended. We consider several possible methods
of corrupting this communication channel in turn.
In terms of modeling the plausibility of our manipulations, in addition to minimizing the evidence of our manipulations, we need to make sure that the message
is believable while still giving some tangible advantage to our side. After all, there
is no sense risking changing a message if that change is of no value to us! Relevant
knowledge for making the changes seem plausible include recent events in the battle,
similarity to past directives, consistency with past behavior of specific commanders,
and compatibility with all known current conditions.

4.3

Destructive Disinformation: Redaction

The simplest, easy-to-accomplish method that we have conceived of is to inject noise
in a subset of the signal which we choose to our advantage. We reduce the information
content of the message, or, in information theoretic terms, we are increasing its
entropy. We do not want to destroy the message outright; instead, we want to
damage the subset of the information we believe is the most important. One way of
doing this is illustrated in figure 4.4. For obvious reasons, we refer to this method
as redaction. A leaky cup of coffee placed strategically on the message before the
courier has it (or indeed after the courier has delivered it, but before it has been
read), can remove or severely degrade key parts of the message. Other tools that
could cause similar damage to our paper medium include a strategic splash with
muddy water or exposure to heat at key positions. In figure 4.2, the expected effect
of this targeted noise injection is shown as the dotted-line circle - the information
content of the message has been reduced, so it could have several possible matches
in the receiver’s model. In the radio domain, this method is akin to intermittent
jamming. In a facial photograph, this is like inflicting damage on strategically chosen
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Figure 4.4: The same message after an unfortunate encounter with a leaky cup of
coffee.

parts of the image (which we will see concretely implemented in chapter 5).
The problem with this method, of course, is that the loss of information is completely obvious to the receiver. He knows what pieces of information are missing
from the message, doesn’t waste a lot of time trying to recover it, and perhaps can
reconstruct partial knowledge about the missing pieces based on information that
did come though, context, and prior knowledge. The other problem with the obviousness of this technique is that if too many messages are delivered with damage that
focuses on only the critical parts of the message, it will be clear that a saboteur is at
work. In the next section, we consider a more subtle class of message manipulation,
one which is harder to detect and is potentially much more powerful.
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4.4

Constructive Disinformation: Airbrushing

What if, instead of just destroying the key information in the message, we were able
to replace parts of it with false, but convincing, information? If we are able to do
this job well, not only might the presence of tampering be less obvious, we might be
able to convince the receiver that they have received an entirely different message.
We are still trying to overflow the channel capacity, but we are doing so in such
a way that the affected words look like they could be legitimate. We refer to this
process as airbrushing. Note that forging messages takes us outside the descriptive
capability of conventional information theory: we are attempting to fool the receiver
into believing that the communication system is behaving normally, when, in fact, it
has failed. One cannot characterize this as an increase in entropy as with redaction.
It is possible for the apparent entropy of the message to change in any way: it can
even decrease.
Once we have decided to employ signal airbrushing, there are several strategies
we can try: consider figure 4.2 once again, focusing on the point marked A. In this
variant, we change the shape of the message in a relatively small way, such that
we think it will be topologically near the correct message in the receiver’s model.
That is, we are changing a message that was real, and we can therefore presume
its plausibility. We try to preserve its plausibility by leaving most of the message
intact, changing it into a nearby message. We illustrate such a modified message
in figure 4.5. In this case, perhaps the replacement bearings are consistent with
historical knowledge about deployments at this position, so the changed message
might be even more plausible that the real one was. We are aiming our deception
at the highest density cluster of messages that is still a small change: We call this
strategy local crowd-blending. This change is small, but if chosen well, but might
have a big effect on the battle to come.
The imperfections caused by how the change was accomplished might be overlooked, at least once, as a genuine error correction on the part of the typist. Our
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chances of successful deception are particularly good if we are able to increase the
plausibility of the message as desired.
With a facial image, the equivalent of this technique is to use digital retouching
methods to reshape or reposition objectively important features. Examples of such
methods will be illustrated in the next chapter.

Figure 4.5: The message with a small, key piece of information modified by our spy.
If the stakes are higher, we might wish to make a bolder airbrushing attempt:
consider position B in figure 4.2. The message has been modified extensively, so
it is much farther away from the original. An example of such a change might be
illustrated by figure 4.6. Ideally, if we are going to make such large modifications, we
would like them to lie in one of the most densely populated regions of the receiver’s
model. We call this strategy global crowd-blending. In the case of our running
example, perhaps this choice of flare colors and the timing of the mortar attacks
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are in accord with the most frequent past events, but are critically wrong for the
upcoming battle. It could be that the commanders have successfully employed a
strategy of moving their forces during bombardment as an element of surprise. If
the artillery gunners were aware of the direction of approach of their own forces,
they could adjust their aim accordingly. Of course, in this case, that was not the
plan, so if this message is plausible, we have led our enemy into a very nasty trap.

Figure 4.6: The message with more substantial modifications.
Of course, no matter how plausible the resulting message, the larger changes
cause more obvious artifacts of tampering, making it easier for our adversary or
detect our subterfuge. There are ways to improve our chances, however. Consider
figure 4.7. In this attempt to deceive, we have made the same changes as 4.6, but
are also using redaction as a form of misdirection: we make liberal use of a lighter
in the hopes of covering up some the evidence of tampering. Notice we have made
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sure that the worst damage is confined to parts of the message that are of lesser
importance, and the receiver might consider themselves lucky that the key parts are
perfectly readable, missing the more subtle tampering that was our real goal.
A variant of this technique, which is difficult to actualize with our paper message
channel, is to use two separate levels of interference. One level is meant to be
detected: a deliberate, but somewhat clumsy, attempt at disinformation. This level
serves as misdirection for more subtle disinformation, which might go undetected,
and might be more valuable for our larger strategy.

Figure 4.7: The with the same modifications as figure 4.6, but with some noise added
to distract from some of the evidence of tampering.
Instead of making difficult-to-hide modifications, another very valuable airbrushing technique we might try is inserting additional distractor information into the
message, as illustrated by figure 4.8. This method might push us into the vicinity
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of D in the receiver’s model as shown in figure 4.2. In this case, we mean that the
target message is a statistical outlier, meaning that this is a very unlikely message
to be sent, but we still think that it is a message that occurs in their model. Perhaps
commanders have heard of retreat being signaled by a flare, but have not actually
received such orders themselves. It might strain credulity a bit too far, or might get
reluctantly accepted. Certainly, more than one or two unusual messages like these
would get accepted without confirmation or investigation. We refer to this as the
curve ball strategy, and could certainly be accomplished by airbrushing as well.

Figure 4.8: A possibly harder-to-detect attempt at inserting disinformation into a
message.
The last possibility shown in 4.2, C, is a statistical outlier that is not likely
to be anywhere near any match in the model. This might be a message that has
been modified to include implausible, outlandish disinformation: the intervention of
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Martian forces, perhaps. We have not fully worked up this case as a full-fledged
example since we don’t think it is often a viable strategy (unless you know your
adversary to be very gullible). In terms of our face recognition problem, such an
implausible outlier might be illustrated by the digital insertion of a third eye.
We conclude this section with one final disinformation method, illustrated by
figure 4.9. The idea is that we corrupt the message before it ever passes through the
typewriter, for instance by passing false information verbally to one or more of the
key players. This is, strictly speaking, not the same class of attack: we have taken
control of the transmitter rather than manipulating the noise source. If we can pull
it off, this method might be very risky indeed, but it has the distinct advantage of
producing a transmission that is free of any evidence of tampering: there have been
no changes at the transmission level. The message is totally genuine: it is just not
the message that was intended.

4.5

Future Developments

As we will show in chapter 5, thinking about this simpler communication scenario,
even in its relatively abstract form, has been a very helpful tool. It has led us to
concrete strategies for disguising faces, and has exposed some of the problems we
might encounter in their use in real-world applications.
We additionally believe that there is a lot more depth to be plumbed in this
model. We are causing deliberate and precise failures of a communication system:
whether the message appears to have been tampered with or not, the intended
message is lost to the receiver. We have therefore moved beyond what information
theory was intended to describe. In terms of formalizing the model, what is really
needed is a framework for reasoning about what our adversary may or may not know,
and a method of characterizing how likely our tampering is to go undetected. This
moves us more into the realm of behavioral game theory [16], a variant of game
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Figure 4.9: An ideal disinformation method: insert the false information earlier in
the process, and the message will lack detectable artifacts.
theory that tries to capture the psychological element into how human beings make
strategic decisions. Such an addition would also be useful for thinking through more
complicated scenarios where, for instance, our adversary has partial information
about our efforts at sabotaging his communication channel, and might make an
effort to communicate steganographically, or perhaps try to goad us into exposing
ourselves with messages specifically crafted as bait. We leave these refinements of
disinformation theory for future work.
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Chapter 5
How to Fool a Caricaturist
5.1

Perpetrating Counter-Caricature

An effective caricature drawing of a person depends on the artist’s ability to decide what visual characteristics are most prominent for their subject (or sometimes
prominent non-visual elements like personality traits). The artist then executes a
cartoon drawing that exaggerates those elements that are distinctive, and simplifies
or eliminates those elements he judges to be unremarkable. An effective caricature
can evoke the identity of its subject more reliably than a real photograph [114].
In the MASKS project, we are also looking for those same set of most salient
cues that other human beings can use to identify each other. Once we know what
those cues are, however, we want to do precisely the opposite of what a caricurist
would do: we want to push the prominent features to their opposite extremes, deemphasize them, or leave them out entirely. Or we might add prominence to features
that our subject did not start with. Or we want to leach out everything that makes
our subject look like herself, making her blend completely into any crowd. If the
result of our handiwork is recognizable as anyone in particular, it certainly should
not be the person we started with.
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5.2

Drinking from a Fire Hose

When deciding how to start organizing our analysis of the data set we have created, we are left with something of a dilemma. A minimum of 96 boundary points
have been annotated for each of the primary frontal photographs for each MASKS
project participant. When one considers how to process the geometric information
containing in the resulting data set, our seemingly modest 96 points become a lot
less manageable. For instance, if we wish to consider all of the possible distances
between pairs of points, this gives us 4560 distributions to consider. If we wish to
look at each of the 3 angles making up triangles of 3 points, even if we throw out
the intra-feature angles, this still leaves well over 400,000 angles to work with. Furthermore, these are just the raw measurements: calculating correlations of pairs of
these measurements gets us well into the billions.
This is not to say that the scale of these calculations are not computationally
feasible. On the contrary: computing these statistics exhaustively is well within the
capabilities of modest computing hardware. The problem is that for these measurements to be any use to us, we need to be able to devise tests that a face recognition
system might be sensitive to, and a human being is required to scrutinize the result
of such tests.
For our current purposes, then, we’ll want to keep the total number of measurements on a human-manageable scale, and strictly with relevance to the task at hand.
At the same time, we want to choose a subset of measurements for our comparison
that is somehow representative of all possible comparisons.
Recall from chapter 3 that we designed the annotation tool like calipers, with one
fixed measurement point per feature. We will take advantage of this in our analysis:
we will compare corresponding radii across the entire subject pool. This process will
be just as if we printed each feature from each face on transparency film, lined up
the origins of their coordinate systems, and examined the correspondence of their
edges.
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Figure 5.1: A reminder of our pose control during the data collection process.
In figure 5.1, we remind the reader of the effort we made while collecting our data
to keep the subject poses consistent. This facilitates the direct comparison of our
measurements since we do not have to make geometric corrections. Any inconsistency
in up-and-down and left-and-right head tilt will cause distortions in the apparent
magnitude of the measurement proportional to the cosine of the difference in tilt
angle. For the vast majority of our measurements, the distortion introduced by the
tilt is less than one pixel, which is the measurement quantum of our system1 . The
1

The largest distance measurements, specifically those covering the facial region, are the only
ones large enough to produce a measurable distortion. These large measurements could have an
error of 2 pixels in the worst case, assuming a maximum angle inconsistency of 5 degrees. This
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only measurement that we think is significantly impacted by pose inconsistency is
the relative facial angle - we highlight this problem below.

Figure 5.2: The relative position of facial features are measured from the origin to
the center of each feature in polar coordinates.
Having decided how to compare intra-feature variation, what about inter-feature
correspondence? Our choice is depicted in figure 5.2. In order to measure how the
facial features are laid out with respect to one another, we need a single coordinate
system whose origin we arbitrarily define to be the center of the nose feature. We
then compute the polar coordinates of the centers of the remaining features with
this origin.
To summarize, we have chosen to break down the variation of the appearance
of our subject pool on a feature-by-feature basis: we compare each corresponding
feature by itself, and compare how these features are arranged with respect to one
is much smaller than the standard deviation of the measurement in question, so this source of
measurement error should have minimal impact on our statistical analysis.
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another. As we will see in the remainder of this chapter, this simple model gives us
plenty of leverage to accomplish the goals of the project.

5.3
5.3.1

Disguise Evaluation
Targeted Disguises

In order to validate our analysis of the annotated image data, we need an objective
way of measuring what sorts of disguise techniques that the face recognition engines
we worked with are sensitive to. To that end, we selected secondary frontal images
of each subject in the probe set. We modified each image with artificial disguises and
tested each of the resulting images, recording how close the engine came to matching
each probe with the correct training example.
As we discussed in chapter 4, there are two broad ways to deprive our adversary
of the information he wants: redaction, in which we degrade (or destroy) parts of
the real signal, or else airbrushing, where we replace parts of the signal with false
information that we hope appears genuine. We take both of these strategies with
the disguises we generated for our testing procedure.
Taking the first strategy, destroying or degrading information, we generated images that had information redacted in specific regions: the result is illustrated in
figure 5.3. The probe images were marked with bounding boxes using VisageMap
using the same annotation process as the training images. Rectangles with the same
center as the bounding box, but slightly larger, were selected for each feature. One
or more of these feature-specific rectangles were filled with random values, and composited onto the original image. As shown in figure 5.4, the compositing was done
according to an increasing sequence of 10 opacity values, so more or less of the original image signal was made available to the face recognition engine by each member
of the sequence. Once the bounding box annotation of image is available, the image
sequence is generated automatically.
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Figure 5.3: We obscure each feature and combinations of features with a rectangle
of random pixels, shown at the same opacity level. An additional image in this set,
not shown, uses a rectangle that covers the entire facial region.
By targeting only a subset of the facial image, we should be able to identify which
features or set of features each engine is depending on for successful recognition. The
idea with varying the opacity of the random overlay image is to obtain a finer degree
of control over how much information is getting through. Since each subject varies
in how important a given feature is to recognition, if targeting a given feature works
at all, the effective threshold of information destruction is going to vary as well. This
gives us more than binary information as to whether a disguise works or not.
Note that this rather heavy-handed technique is intended to be used purely as a
tool for verifying that our statistical analysis supports our hypotheses. We do not
recommend its use for real de-identification operations. With the images that use
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Figure 5.4: We vary the opacity of the noise pixels so that more or less of the real
underlying image data shows through. There are 10 total opacity levels in each
sequence.
less than 100% opacity in the compositing process, it is possible that the noise could
be filtered from the affected areas. It is also certainly subject to a parrot attack [97],
where the face recognition system is retrained with similarly modified images.
We have also created probe images where information was changed in a more
subtle, photo-realistic fashion. In this set of modified images, rather than wiping
out information, we have used photo retouching software to warp portions of the
image, leaving the texture data largely intact, but changing the apparent contours
of the face. Some examples are shown in figure 5.5. Since this is not an image
compositing technique, we could not use the simple opacity variation we used with
the noise-injected samples. Instead, we varied the degree of manipulation. For the
majority of the probe images, a total of 57 images were created in this fashion 2 .

2

A small number of images weren’t completed due to the end of the contracted time with the
artist.
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Figure 5.5: We applying image warping transformations to specific parts of each
image, trying to keep the effect localized to particular features whenever possible. In
these samples, we modify the size of the eyes, the length of the nose, and the width
of the head, respectively.
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This technique has the advantage of making the tampering much less obvious to
the casual observer, and due to the enormous space of images that could be generated
in this way, we believe it is safe from a parrot attack. It has a disadvantage of being
harder to accomplish without unintended side effects. For instance, it is difficult to
widen the forehead without also affecting the eyes and the bridge of the nose. Also,
some fine texture information might need to be removed in order for the warped area
to blend with its surroundings in a realistic way.
Another problem with this technique is that it requires a skilled practitioner to
do it well, and it is presently extremely labor intensive. As such, we were only able
to produce probe images for 23 members of our subject pool. Three of these subjects
are the researchers themselves, and are used as illustrative examples throughout this
document due to publication restrictions on the rest of the subjects. The remaining
members of the probe set were selected at random. As we shall see in the next
section, this group proved more than adequate for the needs of this evaluation. We
also believe that the labor problem is solvable, and we discuss this further in section
5.5, but this is beyond the scope of the current work.
Another option along these lines, which we have not yet explored, is to mix
and match corresponding features from other faces, replacing texture and shape
information from one face with the matching information from another. This too
is very difficult to do well, but perhaps could be incorporated more easily into the
system we envision in section 5.5.

5.3.2

Recognition Engine Details

For all of our disguise evaluation work, we made use of the Face Identification Evaluation System from Colorado State University [10]. This is a set of several face
recognition engines built within a common framework. We did trial runs using all
of the provided recognition engines, but in the end used the classic principal component analysis (PCA) eigenfaces engine as well as one that used linear discriminant
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analysis (LDA). The toolkit also contains a Bayesian classifier, but in our testing,
we found that the results were similar to the PCA analysis, and the run time of the
computation was impractically lengthly for the size of our testing and training sets.
There is also a classifier based on Gabor jets, but it appears that this system is not
designed to have disjoint training and testing sets, so it is unsuitable of the needs of
this project.
Each system was trained on the same set of images that were annotated as
detailed in chapter 3, one for each subject, 303 in total. Since our own set of training
images was relatively small, in order to make the classification task a bit harder for
these systems, we also trained on distractor images drawn from the original FERET
data set [98, 104, 102] as well as the AR image set [87], which brings the total size
of the training set up to 3836 images. In practice, these distractors rarely muddied
the waters as much as we would like. The problem is that these types of recognition
engines are sensitive to lighting variation, which makes them not perform well on
the recognition task when test and training conditions were taken under entirely
different lighting conditions. In our case, however, this is an advantage for them
because this same deficiency makes them good at separating the FERET and AR
images from our images, so few of the distractor images ended up close enough to
our images for mistaken recognition to occur.
The modified images which we described earlier in this section were used as
probes against the trained engines. As a performance baseline, we also tested the
unmodified probe images: we found that the systems successfully identified 100% of
these.
In order to prepare the images for use with the CSU engines, the images were
cropped to a head-and-shoulders view and converted to the PGM floating point image
format, which is the required format for the CSU preprocessor. Eye coordinates,
which were also required inputs, were automatically extracted from annotation data.
The CSU preprocessor then cropped all of the image according to an elliptical mask
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sized based on the eye coordinates, scaled the elliptical crops to a standard size,
and did some color normalization in order to partially compensate to the lighting
sensitivity of PCA. The recognition engines were trained once on the fixed set of
mixed MASKS, FERET and AR training images, and tested with various subsets of
the probe images3 .

5.4
5.4.1

Statistical Analysis
Methodology

For each point that had been marked in the annotation set for at least 50 subjects,
the polar radius was computed, with the center of that features bounding box as the
origin. As explained in chapter 3, the polar angles were held constant by design, so
hold no information for us. For each radius, the following summary statistics were
calculated:
1. Mean
2. Sample variance and population variance
3. Standard deviation and population standard deviation
4. Estimated population skewness (G1 )
5. Estimated population excess kurtosis (G2 )
We also plotted histograms for each radius with bin size chosen as recommended
by Scott [119]. The position in the distribution of each of the 23 probe subjects were
then examined in units of standard deviations from the mean.
As defined at the beginning of this chapter, the polar coordinates of the noserelative position of each feature were calculated. The same summary statistics,
3

We could not run subspace projections of all of the test images in one chunk because of resource
limitations on the servers used to complete the computation.
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histograms, and distributional fits were computed as with the intra-feature radii.
Additionally, we calculate Pearson correlation coefficients and the associated p-value
for all pairings of radii and angles4 .

5.4.2

Observations

Before we present our results, a few broad observations on the distributions are in
order:
• The Pearson correlations at a confidence of p < 0.02 show that the eye positions
are correlated, which is not surprising due to the near bilateral symmetry
observed in most faces. A more interesting result is that the radial position of
the lips is correlated with the eyes, meaning that as the lips get farther from
the nose, so do the eyes.
• There is remarkably little variation in angular positioning of the eyes and the
lips among our subjects. The distributions are almost perfectly normal, but
the standard deviations are only about 0.064 radians (= 3.7◦ ) for each eye and
0.021 radians (= 1.2◦ ) for the lips. This is not terribly surprising for the lips:
the lips are expected to be directly below the nose. The implication for the
eyes is more interesting: apparently the eyes lie along very particular lines in
our polar coordinate system, their positions varying primarily in their radius.
Another way of looking at this is that the angle between the two eyes is nearly
fixed at about 123◦ : the radii of the eyes and mouth divide a circle into very
close to equal portions. Also, the face recognition systems did not seem to be
sensitive to what little variation there was in the angle of the lips.
• The majority of measurements appear to fit a normal distribution very well.
4

We also spot-checked Pearson correlation within features, and as expected, the intra-feature
radii are highly correlated. This fact can probably not be exploited in a photo-realistic disguise
as it would involve deviating from the basic shape of the feature, such as making an eye socket
non-elliptical.
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A few distributions record large skew, and the corresponding histograms show
that a few outliers are the source of the problem. We believe that this is
likely due to under-sampling, but, of course, the only way to prove this is with
more data. Since the male subjects outnumber the female subject by a good
margin, and since the skew is always positive, analyzing the sexes separately
might yield a closer-to-normal distribution, though splitting the sample in this
way could give us different under-sampling problems.
• The distribution of the angle of the facial region appears to be nowhere near
normal. We believe that this is more likely due to the error introduced by the
small inconsistencies in the pose of the subjects rather than a real result. The
radius distribution shows a large skew which could also be explained by this
pose error. Similarly for the intra-feature radii.
Additional raw statistical information is available as appendix C.

5.4.3

Broad Results

One fact that is immediately apparent when perusing the results of running our
disguised faces through each recognition engine: even though the disguises are the
same (or as close as we can make them), the effectiveness pattern of the disguise set is
very different for each subject. This is to be expected: since each face is unique, the
effectiveness of a given disguise should also be unique. Moreover, since our disguises
targeted specific substructures of the face, this supports our first hypothesis: that
the distinctiveness of the face is spatially distributed.
Regardless of how one models the variation in a face, if the axes of variation follow
something like a normal distribution, one would expect to find that the more close
to average a given face is, the harder it would be to identify reliably. In a normal
distribution, by definition, the majority or the distribution is clustered around the
average. The “average” region of the parameter space of the model would therefore
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be more crowded, so the faces that reside there would be hardest to differentiate. At
the other extreme, outliers on a given dimension would be easier to identify; outliers
on many dimensions would be easiest to identify.
Faces that are hard to differentiate in the first place would be expected to be the
easiest to disguise since hiding or distorting whatever weak signal there is to work
with would make a big difference. With faces that have a few distinctive features,
disguises will be most effective when those distinctive features are affected. When
there are many distinctive features present, many or all of those features will need
attention in order to create an effective disguise.
These expectations are well supported by the results of comparing the performance of our disguises to our measurements. To see this, we start by classifying the
disguise performance as follows (in each case, a disguise counts as effective if it was
able to fool 1 or more of the recognition engines):
• Excellent: More than half of the disguises are successful (often almost all of
them)
• Good: About half of the disguises are effective
• Fair: Less than half of the disguises are effective
• Poor: Only 2 or 3 disguises are effective (almost always the ones that affect
more than one feature)
• Out-of-model: Only the random overlay of the entire face is effective (more on
this at later)
We also classify distinctiveness of a given feature as follows:
• Not distinctive: within one standard deviation of the mean
• Weakly distinctive: more than one standard deviation from the mean, but less
than two
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Class
Excellent
Good
Fair
Poor
Out-of-model

Count
8
4
3
5∗
2

Distinctive features
None or 1 weak
2-3 weak or 1 strong
All weak or several weak and 1-2 strong
3-4 strong
Features not captured by model

Table 5.1: Disguise Performance and Subject Distinctiveness Compared. The asterisk indicates an anomaly that we discuss further in the text.
• Strongly distinctive: more than two standard deviations from the mean
We then find that, generally speaking, as disguise performance decreases, feature
distinctiveness and distinctive feature count increases. The results of our examination of the data are summarized in table 5.1.
In the out-of-model cases, we found that, for the features we are currently studying, even completely obscuring every feature was not an effective disguise. However,
obscuring the entire facial region, even at less than 100% opacity, does consistently
work, so we surmise that there is distinctive information to be had by the facial
recognition engine that is not contained within the eyes, nose, or lips. Faces that do
not fit our model are to be expected, and we still believe effective disguises are possible for these individuals: they will simply need to wait for future work to develop
a richer feature set5 .
The cases where we have classified disguise performance as poor are more interesting. In all of these cases, obscuring the eyes, nose and mouth is effective at varying
opacity thresholds for each face. In 5 of these 6 cases, smaller subsets of obscured
features are also effective. In particular, in the case of one of these subjects, each of
the features is strongly distinctive under our criteria, and accordingly, hiding pairs
of the features is also effective: the eyes and the nose, the eyes and the lips, or else
the nose and the lips. We have also generated a few test images that simultaneously
5

Performance with one of the warped images for one particular member of this set suggests that
the eyebrows are a good place to start for this subject.
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warp most or all of the particular features that are distinctive for the subject in
question, and as expected, they have proven effective.
The remaining case, however, is anomalous in several ways: all of the features
have been measured as distinctive, but only weakly so. Despite this face, only the
full face and the eyes, nose, and mouth overlays were effective for this subject, none
of the smaller sets. We speculate that this subject really belongs in the out-ofmodel class: our core features are moderately distinctive, but there are still more
informative features to be discovered outside of our model.

5.4.4

Yes, We’re All Individuals: 3 Case Studies

As explained in chapter 2, in order to protect the privacy of the participants, we are
unable to publish the images of the majority of the subjects, and this hampers our
ability to discuss particular findings for each subject. Fortunately, the photographs
of the 3 main investigators of this effort are not so encumbered. Furthermore, by
chance, it turns out that by the particular metrics we analyzed, each of the 3 researchers fell into a separate class. In this section, we contrast the detailed analytical
results of the group. For ease of comparison, we reproduce our unaltered images sideby-side in figure 5.6.
In the following summary of our statistical findings, the symbol σ represents the
standard deviation of each distribution in question.
Subject 186 is extremely fortunate if he does not wish to be recognized: every
single disguise technique employed in this study worked well for him, and he therefore
falls within our excellent performance class. Disguise performance was about equal
across the board. When compared with the distribution of his measurements, this
is not very surprising. Since his measurements are almost all close to average, he
is intrinsically difficult to separate from the rest of the pack, and depriving the
recognition engine of any information makes matters worse:
• The nose is very slightly narrower than average in the lower middle region.
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Figure 5.6: The appearance of the researchers fall into three separate classes, both in
terms of data analysis and face recognition results. From left to right, these images
depict subjects 186, 303, and 285.
• The measurements are firmly within the average range on all other dimensions.
Subject 303 fares less well, falling two rungs down the performance ladder to the
fair class. An analysis of his features does reveal some highly distinctive regions:
• Both eyes are angularly low by more than 1σ.
• The head is more than 2σ larger than average.
• The remaining feature are close to average.
The multi-feature disguises tended to work best: those hiding some combination of
the eyes, nose, and lips. The general weakness of the disguise scores along with
the success of the disguises that exhibited more coverage suggests that there are
out-of-model features present that nonetheless exhibit high distinction. The most
distinctive feature, the overall size of the head is, unfortunately, not directly manipulated by any of the standard disguises6 . The airbrushed samples that manipulated
6

This is a dimension that is particularly difficult to manipulate on its own: shrinking the entire
head would also shrink all of the inner features. We did not find a satisfactory way of achieving
this manipulation with the tools at hand.
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the mouth area, especially those that widen the lips, as shown in figure 5.7. We
speculate that bringing the widening the lips in this way de-accentuates the highly
distinctive width of the jaw.

Figure 5.7: An airbrushing example applied to subject 303, increasing with width of
the lips in 3 increments.
Finally, subject 285 is essentially out of luck when it comes to our standard
disguise set: he falls in the poor performance class, with no single-feature disguise
that works, and getting only very weak performance even with the multi-feature
disguises. The sole disguise that is highly effective for this subject is the one that
injects noise into the entire facial region. This is not at all surprising when we
examine the measurements of this subject:
• Many points of each eye range larger than average, most between 1 and 2σ,
with a few exceeding 2σ. The radial position of the left eye exceeds 2σ.
• All points on the nose are larger than average, most between 1 and 2σ, a few
ranging higher.
• The internal measurements of the lips are about average, however the lips are
positioned well over 2σ lower on the face than average.
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• The head, particularly the lower half, exceeds 1σ and comes close to 2σ in
some places.
With subjects 285 and 303, we additionally experimented with mixtures of airbrushing techniques, affecting several features at once. The resulting images, which
proved successful disguises, are shown in figure 5.8. These targeted both the features
that our analysis revealed as distinctive, as well as features that stood out according
to our own intuitions. These very aggressive manipulations introduced artifacts that
make the presence of airbrushing obvious, and might themselves contribute to their
effectiveness. Nonetheless, this result suggests that given even a very distinctive face,
we can find the right set of manipulations to create an effective disguise. Furthermore, as we delve into in the next and final section, we believe that this process can
be automated, and the quality of the morphing of the images could minimize the
artifacts of the process.

5.5
5.5.1

Future Work
More Data: Better Statistics and Automated Segmentation

The most important thing that would the MASKS project could benefit from additional direct investment in the work we have begun. In order to really capture the
diversity of human facial appearance, we need a larger image set that matches or
exceeds the quality of the MASKS data set. In addition to raw numbers, we need an
image set that is demographically controlled. In particular, we need sufficient and
independent statistical coverage with regard to gender, age, and self-identified ethnic
origin. We believe that there is much to be learned by studying individual variation
within each group, as well as comparing the cross-group distributional variation.
Having a larger annotated image set brings with it the possibility of partially
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Figure 5.8: Using more aggressive airbrushing, we are able to make even very recognizable subjects look less like themselves. On the left is the untouched image of
each of subjects 303 and 285. On the right is the manipulated image.
automating the annotation process: we can use supervised learning techniques in
order to build a, perhaps imperfect, automatic image segmentation system. At
the very least, this could be used to jump start a much larger scale annotation
process: the first round of annotation could be done by a robot and corrected by
human beings. The number of examples needed to bootstrap an automatic system
is very much a function of the complexity of the underlying high-dimensional space:
the critical thresholds would need to be determined experimentally. Ultimately, we
would like to have enough data to train a fully automated segmentation system: such
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a component will be a necessary prerequisite to achieve a fully automatic disguisegeneration device.
As expected, our analysis has shown us that while the features that we extracted
for this project are very informative, they are not sufficient to fully model the distinctiveness of our subject population, let alone humanity in general. We need to
add many more features to our mark-up. Some promising examples include: bony
prominences like cheekbones, the ocular orbits, the mandibular bone, and the size
and shape of the forehead. We think facial hair-growing regions also hold much distinctive information (particularly the eyebrows), as do the appearance and position
of the ears, and even the size and shape of the philtrum. Exploring substructures of
the gross features we are already covering such as the irises and more contours of the
nose would be useful. Our alternate camera views would help inform many of these
tasks. We will also need to increase the resolution of the existing feature set: we
know for certain, for instance, that the inner parts of the eye are very under-sampled,
as is the lower region of the nose. The data and the apparatus of the MASKS project
stand ready to take on the burden of a more comprehensive effort.

5.5.2

Getting Practical

We close this dissertation by returning to some of the applications we mentioned in
the introduction. We discuss why we find these applications compelling, and suggest
what we think are the most promising strategies for getting where we need to be.
5.5.2.1

Recognizability

One of the results of our earlier investigations [2] using the AR database [87] which we
found absolutely fascinating is that, even with very different underlying architectures,
automatic face recognition consistently have a hard time recognizing some faces, and
others are easy to recognize despite the removal of large percentages of their facial
regions, whether that removal is done artificially or with real-world disguises. Our
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current investigations suggest that this is a real phenomenon rather than purely an
artifact of the recognition algorithms. It is also supported by the human faculty for
recognition: we describe some faces as nondescript, others as striking.
Once the work of making our statistical sample more comprehensive is complete,
we will be able to synthesize a quantitative metric of just how distinctive a given
face is. Furthermore, we would be able to say exactly what features make this so.
This would be a particularly compelling tool for the criminal justice system: we
would have a means of assessing the probability of successful identification by a
witness, whether in-person or via a camera. In particular, we would be able to show
that a particularly distinctive face should be easy to recognize even on a low-quality
video recording if the high-order features are still clearly recognizable. Conversely,
we could tell if an eye-witness account is weakened if the observed person is very
average-looking person standing 100 feet away.
5.5.2.2

Automatic Disguises

As we discussed briefly in the introduction, in prior work [2], we found that for
most individuals, real-world countermeasures against face recognition require very
aggressive techniques, such as bandaging most of the head, using substantial latex
appliances, or disabling cameras with lasers. Unless they are employed by as a covert
agent, we think that most people are not going to want to pay the price for this level
of privacy7 . This problem is only going to get more challenging as face recognition
and imaging technology continues to improve.
This is not to say that applications of face recognition are of no interest to the
general public. Far from it: by far the most compelling reason we have thought of
to take this work further is to find a means of automating what we have done in this
chapter: customized, artificial disguise generation. We mentioned several fartherout applications for such a technology in the introduction: a camera-based public
7

However, perhaps the intelligence agencies should consider using this research to try to hire
provably nondescript agents.
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health detector, or security cameras with face-privatizing technology built right in.
Another application that is more immediately relevant at the time of this writing
comes with the explosion in the sharing of still and video imagery on the public
internet. Once this imagery gets uploaded, its spread becomes difficult or impossible
to control: these images will make their way to other contexts, and other eyes, than
was originally intended. We think that the first photo sharing or social networking
site that offered the ability to privatize images on upload would find themselves with
a value-added service that a lot of people would be willing to pay for.
We assume that in addition to de-identifying the faces, another important goal
for this application would be images that still look good: people should still look
like people. This rules out methods that are simply destroy information like our
noise injection redaction techniques. This leaves us with airbrushing, but it need
not only be the type of airbrushing that we have used in this chapter. We do,
however, believe that feature-morphing technique must be at least one component of
the toolkit: the large musculoskeletal features that we focused on in this dissertation
are difficult to hide any other way. Other possibilities include removal or injection of
textural features, such as simulating the effects of age, removal of the same, addition
or removal of prominent identifying marks such as birthmarks, piercings, or tattoos.
We could also borrow features or textures from other individuals, producing hybrid
faces composed of the parts of many individuals (an idea similar to this is proposed
in [97]). Some of these types of effects can already be largely automated, and come
as one of the many tools in professional photo retouching software.
Doing realistic morphing of the facial structure, however, remains a painstaking,
manual task. Fortunately, there is some hope of automating even this at some
point in the future. We have become aware of some very promising and relevant
research that arose from a very different application: creating realistic, novel faces
with controllable articulation for use in computer animation. Zhang and Badler [5]
offer a nice overview of the state of the art in this area as well as their own impressive
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approach. Their technique relies on analysis of high-resolution 3D scans of human
subjects, along with simultaneously acquired texture information. They identify a
set of anatomical markers on the meshes resulting from the scans, and use these
markers to line up the texture data for mapping onto meshes from different heads,
or else averages of sets of meshes. The result is like wrapping the surface tissues of
one face onto the muscles and skull of another, which is much what we would want
for our application.
It is unlikely that we could immediately get such realistic results as they achieve
making use of our less informative data: the information contained in a single still
photograph, offering only a single perspective of the face. However, there are bodies
of research on the subject of 3D reconstruction of a head from still photographs, and
we have even collected multiple perspectives of our current subject set, so perhaps
bridging the divide between these two data sets is not out of the question.
The beauty of working on this problem of photorealistically modifying faces is
that it can be worked on entirely independently from refining the results of the
MASKS project. Both lines of research can proceed independently: we supply the
means of identifying the features that should be modified, they supply the mechanism
by which the modification is accomplished.
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Appendix A
MASKS Annotation Files
Below is a sample annotation file that has been completed according to the MASKS
template version 1. The template itself is very similar: the rect and polygon
elements would be missing and the value of the masks:cntlpoints attribute will be
empty. As it happens, the comment elements were not used in this file, but in general
they might contain comments about difficulties encountered during the annotation
process. These start out empty in the template as well.
A structured data file like this will necessarily be difficult to read in a printed
medium, but where possible, we have added whitespace has been modified from the
original file in order to enhance readability in the confines of the page.

<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8" standalone="no"?>
<svg contentScriptType="text/ecmascript" masks:tmplVersion="1"
width="3504"
xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink" zoomAndPan="magnify"
contentStyleType="text/css" height="2336"
xmlns:masks="http://nonsense.cis.upenn.edu/namespaces/masks"
preserveAspectRatio="xMidYMid meet"
xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg"
version="1.0">
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<g masks:label="Image Layer" id="imageLayer" masks:groupmode="layer">
<title>
Image Layer
</title>
<image x="0" y="0" width="3504"
xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink"
xlink:href="base0303.jpg" style="display:inline"
xlink:type="simple" xlink:actuate="onLoad" height="2336"
preserveAspectRatio="xMidYMid meet" xlink:show="embed"/>
</g>
<g masks:mincntlpoints="16" masks:label="Facial region"
masks:optionallayer="false" masks:cntlpoints="16"
style="display:inline" id="facialRegion" masks:groupmode="layer">
<title>
Facial region
</title>
<desc>
<masks:detail>
The entire visible facial region. The topmost points
should go to the hairline. Where the hairline is
not visible, make your best guess where the hairline
is - you can often extrapolate from positions where
the hairline is visible. If the subject is bald,
extend the top points all the way to the top of the
scalp. On the sides, do not include the ears. On
the bottom, go to the jawline, but do not include
the neck.
</masks:detail>
<masks:comment/>
</desc>
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<rect x="1423.50" y="250.50" masks:shapetype="bbox" fill="none"
width="735.00" height="1041.00" stroke="none"
stroke-width="2"/>
<polygon fill="none" masks:shapetype="segment" stroke-width="2"
masks:genMode="isoangle"
points="1791.00 1291.50 1604.61 1220.98 1485.75 1076.25
1433.20 919.20 1423.50 771.00 1455.33 631.96
1494.00 474.00 1603.55 318.46 1791.00 250.50
1978.00 319.55 2083.63 478.37 2121.04 634.29
2158.00 771.00 2153.86 921.30 2101.38 1081.38
1980.08 1227.48"
stroke="palegreen"/>
</g>
<g masks:mincntlpoints="16" masks:label="Right eye opening"
masks:optionallayer="false" masks:cntlpoints="16"
style="display:inline" id="rightEyeOpening"
masks:groupmode="layer">
<title>
Right eye opening
</title>
<desc>
<masks:detail>
The visible region of the right eye. Note that this
is the subject&apos;s right, so the correct eye
will be the one closest to the left edge of the
window. Do not include any part of the eyelid, but
do include everything inside of it, going all the
way to the corner points of the eyelid, including
the fleshy area (usually pink) in the inner corner.
If any part of the opening is hidden (such as by
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eyeglasses), try your best to guess where the hidden
edge is.
</masks:detail>
<masks:comment/>
</desc>
<rect x="1587.00" y="663.00" masks:shapetype="bbox" fill="none"
width="143.00" height="55.00" stroke="none"
stroke-width="2"/>
<polygon fill="none" masks:shapetype="segment" stroke-width="2"
masks:genMode="isoangle"
points="1658.50 716.00 1647.44 717.20 1633.00 716.00
1614.09 708.89 1587.00 690.50 1612.94 671.63
1632.75 664.75 1647.20 663.22 1658.50 665.00
1668.17 667.15 1678.00 671.00 1691.27 676.93
1711.00 690.50 1705.58 710.00 1681.25 713.25
1668.70 715.11"
stroke="palegreen"/>
</g>
<g masks:mincntlpoints="16" masks:label="Left eye opening"
masks:optionallayer="false" masks:cntlpoints="16"
style="display:inline"
id="leftEyeOpening" masks:groupmode="layer">
<title>
Left eye opening
</title>
<desc>
<masks:detail>
The visible region of the left eye. Note that this
is the subject&apos;s left, so the correct eye will
be the one closest to the right edge of the window.
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Do not include any part of the eyelid, but do include
everything inside of it, going all the way to the
corner points of the eyelid, including the fleshy
area (usually pink) in the inner corner. If any
part of the opening is hidden (such as by eyeglasses),
try your best to guess where the hidden edge is.
</masks:detail>
<masks:comment/>
</desc>
<rect x="1872.00" y="662.00" masks:shapetype="bbox" fill="none"
width="140.00" height="56.00" stroke="none"
stroke-width="2"/>
<polygon fill="none" masks:shapetype="segment" stroke-width="2"
masks:genMode="isoangle"
points="1942.00 717.00 1931.30 715.82 1919.00 713.00
1898.00 708.22 1887.00 690.00 1907.31 675.63
1919.75 667.75 1931.43 664.47 1942.00 664.00
1953.35 662.59 1967.62 664.38 1986.87 671.41
2010.50 690.00 1990.61 710.13 1968.38 716.37
1953.55 717.87"
stroke="palegreen"/>
</g>
<g masks:mincntlpoints="32" masks:label="Nose"
masks:optionallayer="false"
masks:cntlpoints="32" style="display:inline" id="nose"
masks:groupmode="layer">
<title>
Nose
</title>
<desc>
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<masks:detail>
Outline of the entire nose, excluding nostril
openings. Place the top center control point so
that it lies along the brow ridge. The bottom center
contol point should go at the lowest visible part
of the septum, which is the part of the nose that
divides the nasal passages. Because the transition
of the nose into the rest of the face is so gradual,
the edges can often be very difficult to see: if
necessary, extrapolate from regions where the edges
are clear.
</masks:detail>
<masks:comment/>
</desc>
<rect x="1709.50" y="634.50" fill="none" width="176.00"
height="293.00"
stroke="none" masks:shapetype="bbox" stroke-width="2"/>
<polygon fill="none" masks:shapetype="segment" stroke-width="2"
masks:genMode="isoangle"
points="1797.50 927.50 1772.54 906.50 1749.88 895.96
1712.61 908.05 1719.13 859.38 1726.23 828.62
1728.98 809.38 1734.03 793.63 1739.50 781.00
1741.44 769.85 1743.40 758.59 1745.59 746.31
1748.88 732.38 1751.36 711.95 1754.14 676.32
1768.43 634.87 1797.50 634.50 1826.57 634.83
1858.12 634.65 1853.38 697.37 1851.50 727.00
1854.98 742.59 1857.19 756.27 1859.12 768.74
1861.00 781.00 1865.19 794.46 1868.85 810.55
1872.50 831.11 1873.75 857.25 1881.94 907.38
1845.64 897.22 1823.46 911.49"
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stroke="palegreen"/>
</g>
<g masks:mincntlpoints="16" masks:label="Lips"
masks:optionallayer="false"
masks:cntlpoints="16" style="display:inline" id="lips"
masks:groupmode="layer">
<title>
Lips
</title>
<desc>
<masks:detail>
The lips, both upper and lower together. The edges
of the lips are usually a significantly different
color or texture than the surrounding skin, but
they aren&apos;t always a uniform color.

Watch out

for lipstick, which can make the true lip boundaries
more difficult to locate. Only include the lips,
even if the visible parts of the lips do not coincide
with the mouth corners. However if this is the case,
please use the optional mouth opening feature to
indicate the boundaries of the mouth.
</masks:detail>
<masks:comment/>
</desc>
<rect x="1675.00" y="1001.00" masks:shapetype="bbox" fill="none"
width="241.00" height="96.00" stroke="none"
stroke-width="2"/>
<polygon fill="none" masks:shapetype="segment" stroke-width="2"
masks:genMode="isoangle"
points="1795.50 1097.00 1775.68 1096.84 1751.12 1093.38
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1715.78 1082.02 1678.00 1049.00 1719.20 1017.39
1753.13 1006.62 1776.57 1003.29 1795.50 1009.00
1814.17 1003.94 1840.12 1004.38 1871.35 1017.58
1914.00 1049.00 1869.05 1079.47 1836.13 1089.62
1814.55 1095.00"
stroke="palegreen"/>
</g>
<g masks:mincntlpoints="0" masks:label="Mouth opening"
masks:optionallayer="true" masks:cntlpoints="0"
style="display:inline"
id="mouthOpening" masks:groupmode="layer">
<title>
Mouth opening
</title>
<desc>
<masks:detail>
If the lips do not extend all the way to the visible
corners of the mouth opening, use this feature to
mark the boundaries of the mouth opening, i.e. every
part of the mouth between the lips, not just any
open part of the mouth. A bounding box is sufficient
- you need not place any control points. The box
should go all the way to each mouth corner. Some
parts of the lips will also be inside the box
depending on how the mouth opening is curved. If
the grid does not allow you to produce a narrow
enough bounding box, just get as close as you can
and note the problem in the comments tab (you need
not use the&quot;submit stuck&quot; server request).
Note that it is possible that the mouth corners
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will be simulatneously the bottom-most point and
the left/right-most points.
</masks:detail>
<masks:comment/>
</desc>
</g>
</svg>
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Appendix B
The MASKS Software Suite: A
Developer’s Overview
In this appendix, we offer a very quick tour of the VisageMap software suite. This is
intended to get any interested developers started with navigating the software developed as part of this dissertation. Much of the software has its own documentation,
but we have decided to not include that material in the current document since most
of it is in Javadoc format. Javadoc is composed of heavily hyperlinked HTML, and it
would be awkward at best to reproduce this structure with textual cross-referencing.
It is also still getting some additional development work at the time of this writing,
so fine details included here might be deprecated very quickly.
The definitive documentation is, of course, the source code itself, where we strive
to follow a “literate programming” discipline, commenting liberally, making all identifiers suggestive of their function, etc.

B.1

MasksSVGLib

This is a pure Java library that contains the core data structures used to represent
MASKS annotation files inside of VisageMap, VisageTemplate, and various analysis
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tools. It also contains definitions of all of our SVG extensions, as well as objects and
utility methods useful for unpacking annotation files and interpreting the data. This
should be the starting point for developers wishing to write software for making use
of the MASKS data set.

B.2

VisageMap

This is the flagship application of the MASKS project. This tool was used to create
all of the annotated data, and can be used to visualize it as well. It is built from a
collection of NetBeans modules, each of which contains one or several Java classes.
The relationships between the modules are summarized in figure B.1. We briefly
describe the purpose of each of the modules. VisageMap is designed such that its
facilities might be modified for other forensic image annotation and analysis tasks.
This section should help interested parties track down the functionality they might
be interested in repurposing.
• SVGviewer
This module contains various pieces of the graphical user interface used to
visualize MASKS annotation files. This includes:
– the main SVG viewer window
– the viewer controls, which can be used to zoom the main viewer and select
layers for viewing and editing.
– the layer navigator, which allows selecting layers and setting whether they
should be rendered or not
– a viewer for the textual properties of each layer
This module also controls the default layout of the editing GUI, however the
user is free to choose their own layout, which the underlying windowing system
remembers for future sessions.
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VisageMap

SVGviewer

MasksTaskManager

BrandingSupport

MasksConfManager

MasksTask

VisageLayerEditor
MasksFileManager

Not Shown:
VisageLogger
and various
NetBeans APIs

VisageLayer

Apache Batik

MasksSVGLib

SVNKit

Figure B.1: Modular dependencies in the VisageMap source code. Module names
in italic type are open source software packages, used without modification. The
relative positions of the modules in this diagram are not intended to be meaningful.

The production work for the MASKS project generally loaded files downloaded
from the network into these modules automatically as part of an annotation
assignment. There are, however, also facilities for working with files stored on
the local file system.

• VisageLayer
This contains the VisageLayer class, which is the abstraction of graphical layers that is used by all other classes that understand layers, including visualization of them by SVGViewer and modification of them in VisageLayerEditor.
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It also contains VisageLayerList, which represents the stack of layers contained in the underlying SVG file, and provides the means of serializing the
layers to a on-disk file.
• VisageLayerEditor
This contains the implementation of the layer editing window, including all of
its sub-elements. Most notably, it contains the UI elements that control the
process of adding and manipulating boundary points.
• MasksTask
This currently has only one class, TaskDesc, an abstraction of an annotation
task.
• MasksTaskManager
This set of classes implements the client side of the MASKS annotation protocol. This includes the user interface elements for managing tasks, tracking of
task state, and communicating with other annotators. It also contains all of
the network code for communicating with the MASKS server. This contains
some of the trickiest code in the application owing to handling the many edge
cases that arise in managing and distributing tasks according to the MASKS
protocol.
Also included here are some of the components used for communication across
project participants: the components which expose the annotation commit log
to the annotators and a tool enabling news broadcasts to all annotators from
the annotation supervisor.
• MasksFileManager
This module talks to the portion of the MASKS server that implements version
control on annotation files, currently based on Subversion [133], but there is
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sufficient abstraction to allow a different back-end. It also manages local storage of the files that figure into the annotation process: templates, annotation
files, and the photographs themselves.
• MasksConfManager
This contains code to manage local configuration files, which are necessary for
some of the other modules.
• BrandingSupport
The very simple classes in this module set the version number reported in the
UI and network client code.
• VisageLogger
This extremely important module is left out of the diagram in figure B.1 for the
sake of readability since almost every module depends on it. It provides logging
messages onto the local machine, which are vital for diagnosing problems with
a running instance of the tool.
• Apache Batik
A Java toolkit for creating, manipulating, and rendering SVG images [138]. As
far as we are aware, this is the most comprehensive open source SVG toolkit
by a very wide margin. This library undoubtably saved us a lot of time in
developing VisageMap, but it does has its drawbacks. Since its capabilities
are so extensive, there is substantial functionality loaded into memory that we
don’t need, and this causes the memory footprint of the application to be much
larger than strictly necessary. This becomes particularly obvious when loading
multiple annotations simultaneously. In particular, much of this memory is
spent making the renderer very fast, fast enough for smooth animation, which
is not needed for our purposes. In the future, it might be wise to replace the
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Batik renderer with something lighter, or look at the possibility of reusing a
single renderer instance for multiple files.
• SVNKit
A Java toolkit implementing client services for the Subversion version control
system [131, 133].
• Apache Log4j
A popular and very flexible logging library for the Java programming language
[82]. VisageLogger is currently just a very light wrapper for Log4j, though it
is designed to allow swapping in a different logging facility if desired.

B.3

VisageTemplate

This tool is used to generate MASKS template files used to control the precise
requirements of a MASKS annotation task. It makes use of the same core library,
MasksSVGLib, used by VisageMap. This insures that the notion of what constitutes
a MASKS annotation file is consistent. It mostly makes good re-use of the XML
editor provided in the NetBeans IDE, with a dialog for inserting new MASKS layers
and setting parameters that make up those layers. Since it was used only by the
annotation supervisor, not much effort was expended toward making it as polished
as VisageMap.

B.4

MASKS server software

The MASKS server is composed of two major parts: a Subversion server, which
stores every submitted revision of each annotation file, and MasksServer::Request,
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a Perl module that implements the logic and database services needed to centralize the progress-tracking of each annotation task. It assigns specific work to individual annotators according to the MASKS annotation protocol. In order to sustain acceptable transactional performance for our concurrent, distributed use-case,
MasksServer::Request is designed to be executed under mod perl2 [90]. This is an
Apache module that allows Perl modules to be compiled once and kept in memory,
resulting in a large performance boost over the conventional Perl run-time.
There is substantial documentation inside the MasksServer::Request module
in POD format, which is the standard documentation format for Perl. There are
CGI programs that interface with the services provided by MasksServer::Request;
VisageMap accesses these CGI programs via a web server using the HTTPS protocol.
There is also as command-line tool, masksadmin.pl, which is used to administer the
server. Administrative functions include initializing the server for first-time use,
querying the current server state, manual reassignment of task, and backing up the
server data.

B.5

Image Management Tools

As described in chapter 2, the raw images that form the basis of the MASKS data
set are comprised of many thousands of fairly large files, so we needed some tools
to track down and examine any particular image we are interested in. The simplest
of these, localview, simply displays the specified images by calling the qiv image
viewer1 , having selected command-line flags appropriate for our images. The other
programs, sinspect and vinspect2 are used to view still- and video-camera images
1

All image-viewing functions of the tools described in this section is done with the open source
image viewer qiv [143]. This viewer was chosen primarily because it lives up to the “quick” part
of the “Quick Image Viewer” acronym that gives it its name. It loaded the large images produced
by the MASKS project noticeably faster than any other viewers we tried. Also, conveniently for
viewing our video frames, it has the ability to play sequences of images as a slide show in the order
we want to see them, and offers complete control of the program from the keyboard.
2
These are technically the same program, one that changes its behavior appropriately depending
on the name used to call it. This was done for ease of maintaining them since the vast majority of
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that are already stored in the MASKS repository. These programs know how to
interpret timestamps recorded in each file name and other sources of metadata, and
they intelligently group together images that were taken at the same time. We
call these image groups “bursts” in the documentation for these programs; if called
without arguments, these programs default to showing the most recent burst for the
currently active subject. If there is no active subject, a subject ID must be specified
with the --subject flag. The --list flag prints out the available bursts for the
chosen subject. Both programs default to viewer mode, showing a sample of the
specified burst at a zoom level that fills the current screen; the --detail switch
can show each image at full resolution. Each program can also print out the list
of files that make up the chosen burst instead of displaying them. The semantics
of this operation, along with the several other available command line options, are
explained in the command usage information, available via the --help flag.

B.6

MasksAnalysis Tools

There are several tools that were developed to ease analysis of the MASKS data set.
The MasksExplode class contains methods for unpacking the annotation data so that
corresponding points across the subject pool are reorganized, one point per file, one
entry per subject. We developed scripts to consume this unpacked data, perform
various coordinate system conversions, and calculate the statistical relationships of
the points studied in chapter 5.
The generation of the random noise composite images illustrated in chapter 5
was done automatically by the ImageComposite class. The data for positioning the
rectangles on top of the images was generated directly from bounding boxes in the
annotated data.
Several scripts were also developed to automate the necessary preprocessing
the underlying code is the same.
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needed to convert the image data into a form compatible with the CSU Face Identification Evaluation kit.

B.7

Miscellaneous

Considering the considerable effort that went into creating it, we have, of course,
taken steps to minimize the risk of loss of all project data by keeping it redundantly
backed up. For the raw images, the primary repository is stored on a RAID storage
array, which is configured to tolerate the loss of several of its component drives before
any data loss occurs. A mirror of the entire data set is automatically maintained
on a separate file server, located in a separate lab in a different building within the
complex that houses the University of Pennsylvania’s engineering school. A third
RAID is now maintained outside of the school. Additionally, a complete backup of
the data set was maintained as the MASKS database grew, built using a backup
tool designed for the project, maskback. This program employed a custom database
that kept track of which files had been assigned to a DVD, and which needed to
still be backed up. It recorded the SHA1 sums for all backed-up files and additional
metadata. Although maskback was designed to keep related files together whenever
possible, since, at this writing, this backup set is comprised of more than 60 DVDs,
finding a particular file could be an exercise in tedium. Fortunately, the backup
database can be queried to identify the medium where file of interest is stored.
Multiple copies of these DVDs were made and stored off-site.
Since these backups were maintained while the database was still growing, in
order to keep the final DVD count as small as possible, the system is designed to
monitor whether enough data has been collected to fill an entire DVD, and notify
the backup operator whenever a new DVD was ready for burning. There are also
several other automated tasks that make sure the database is kept up to date, that
related database entries are always consistent, et cetera.
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Since we intend to offer this database as a resource to the research community,
the architecture underlying the maskback tool was designed with future distribution
needs in mind. For instance, since the total size of the database is quite large even
by current standards, the backup system is easy to modify in order to allow creating
more manageable subsets of the complete data set, or else for distribution on highercapacity media than single-layer DVDs.
The Subversion repositories that contain the annotation data, as well as a separate repository containing the source code for the project software, are automatically
duplicated and distributed across geographically-distributed storage devices, just like
the raw image data.
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Appendix C
Measurement Summary of the
MASKS Data Set
The tables in this appendix contain summary statistics collected for each point of
the MASKS annotations. Histograms of each feature along with distributional fits
of each analyzed subject are available as part of the MASKS data set1 .
In each of the following tables, each column contains statistics for the labeled data
point. The symbols used to label each table row should be interpreted as follows:
φ

The angle used to take a radial measurement

r̄

Mean radius relative to feature center

σ2

Sample variance

s2

Population variance

σ

Standard deviation

s

Population standard deviation

G1

Estimated population skewness

G2

Estimated population excess kurtosis

These tables are mostly of interest in comparing them with measurements of
1

We do not provide the histograms in this document since we believe that the statistics we have
provided are as informative as the plots would be, if not more so.
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particular individuals, in seeing where that individual lies in the larger patterns.
The primary utility of including these tables here, then, is to provide some useful
points of comparison to other researchers who might not have immediate access to
the full MASKS data set. In particular, these tables provide a means of comparing
new measurements from one or more photographs not in the MASKS data set to
the distributions generated by the MASKS set. For anyone interested in doing this,
there are several things to keep in mind (all of these points are also relevant if you
are planning to extend the MASKS data set):
• Our measurements are taken from photographs, which are 2D projections of a
3D human face. Care must be taken to not compare 3D surface measurements
directly with their flat projections, which can be significantly different.
• If the new measurements are also from photographs, the poses used for the
MASKS capture procedure should be replicated, if possible. Alternatively,
the new image could be perspective-warped to match our frontal pose (or the
equivalent geometric corrections could be made on a per-measurement basis).
Small deviations, however, should only introduce minimal error.
• Just like the measurements within the MASKS data set, any new measurements
must be taken consistently with ours. The easiest way to accomplish this is by
using VisageMap with the same templates and rules we used for our production
work. A different tool could be used provided the same per-feature reference
points and measurement angles are used. Even measurements taken from a
printed photograph with a ruler and a protractor are a viable possibility.
• All of our measurements are in pixels. The absolute scale of the measurements is fixed by the geometry of the cameras in the capture system. As can
be measured directly from any MASKS photograph, the camera and subject
placements result in a conversion ratio of 1 cm :: 49 pixels. That is, measurements of any pair of points that are 1 cm apart in the imaging plane appear
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as 49 pixels apart in the resulting digital image. To compare directly with our
data, new photographs will need to be converted to this scale. Alternatively,
only scale-independent measurements would be directly comparable, e.g. angles or ratios of any pair of our linear measurements.
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φ
r̄
σ2
s2
σ
s
G1
G2
φ
r̄
σ2
s2
σ
s
G1
G2
φ
r̄
σ2
s2
σ
s
G1
G2

L0M0
0.000
24.054
12.377
12.336
3.518
3.512
-0.250
0.328
L2M1
0.750
28.769
12.750
12.708
3.571
3.565
-0.426
0.472
L1M1
1.500
64.371
32.801
32.693
5.727
5.718
-5.405
0.558

L3M0
0.125
24.464
12.592
12.551
3.549
3.543
-0.640
0.550
L3M3
0.875
24.872
10.981
10.944
3.314
3.308
-0.101
0.327
L3M6
1.625
48.416
34.563
34.449
5.879
5.869
0.819
0.377

L2M0
0.250
28.907
18.307
18.246
4.279
4.272
-2.033
0.606
L0M1
1.000
24.474
12.736
12.694
3.569
3.563
-0.010
0.089
L2M3
1.750
33.292
19.929
19.863
4.464
4.457
-1.417
0.453

L3M1
0.375
43.433
60.950
60.749
7.807
7.794
1.631
0.236
L3M4
1.125
26.385
14.175
14.128
3.765
3.759
0.117
0.078
L3M7
1.875
26.246
13.618
13.573
3.690
3.684
-0.646
0.465

L1M0
0.500
53.690
45.200
45.051
6.723
6.712
-3.769
0.071
L2M2
1.250
33.061
21.693
21.621
4.658
4.650
1.046
0.102

Table C.1: Left eye opening
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L3M2
0.625
37.192
18.029
17.970
4.246
4.239
-1.391
0.088
L3M5
1.375
45.437
28.143
28.050
5.305
5.296
0.759
0.274

φ
r̄
σ2
s2
σ
s
G1
G2
φ
r̄
σ2
s2
σ
s
G1
G2
φ
r̄
σ2
s2
σ
s
G1
G2

L0M0
0.000
24.102
13.246
13.202
3.640
3.634
-0.272
0.534
L2M1
0.750
33.414
20.601
20.533
4.539
4.531
1.776
0.994
L1M1
1.500
53.525
48.502
48.342
6.964
6.953
4.339
0.345

L3M0
0.125
26.563
14.302
14.255
3.782
3.776
-0.189
0.580
L3M3
0.875
26.557
14.178
14.131
3.765
3.759
0.751
0.812
L3M6
1.625
44.455
64.643
64.430
8.040
8.027
6.804
0.093

L2M0
0.250
33.967
21.418
21.347
4.628
4.620
-0.393
0.653
L0M1
1.000
24.596
12.714
12.672
3.566
3.560
0.333
0.715
L2M3
1.750
29.054
19.111
19.047
4.372
4.364
-0.169
0.427

L3M1
0.375
48.956
35.587
35.469
5.965
5.956
0.430
0.173
L3M4
1.125
24.932
11.654
11.616
3.414
3.408
1.044
0.712
L3M7
1.875
24.548
12.981
12.938
3.603
3.597
-0.302
0.456

L1M0
0.500
64.789
33.619
33.508
5.798
5.789
-4.207
0.182
L2M2
1.250
28.705
13.867
13.822
3.724
3.718
1.022
0.572

Table C.2: Right eye opening
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L3M2
0.625
46.037
29.754
29.656
5.455
5.446
3.107
1.093
L3M5
1.375
36.897
19.991
19.925
4.471
4.464
2.144
0.688

φ
r̄
σ2
s2
σ
s
G1
G2
φ
r̄
σ2
s2
σ
s
G1
G2
φ
r̄
σ2
s2
σ
s
G1
G2
φ
r̄
σ2
s2
σ
s
G1
G2

L0M0
0.000
145.427
136.688
136.237
11.691
11.672
15.240
-0.055
L3M1
0.375
79.617
96.711
96.392
9.834
9.818
4.049
-0.025
L2M1
0.750
74.255
48.261
48.102
6.947
6.936
2.591
0.528
L3M4
1.125
124.736
191.364
190.733
13.833
13.811
42.271
2.300

L4M0
0.062
128.517
166.800
166.249
12.915
12.894
9.227
-0.141
L4M3
0.438
70.793
70.822
70.588
8.416
8.402
5.757
0.040
L4M6
0.813
89.562
71.366
71.130
8.448
8.434
2.533
0.733
L4M9
1.188
92.774
74.982
74.734
8.659
8.645
7.979
0.719

L3M0
L4M1
0.125
0.188
125.841 154.797
297.970 160.189
296.987 159.661
17.262 12.657
17.233 12.636
69.759 13.042
1.160
0.958
L1M0
L4M4
0.500
0.562
65.190 63.366
57.985 46.680
57.793 46.526
7.615
6.832
7.602
6.821
6.976
4.223
0.079
0.199
L3M3
L4M7
0.875
0.937
119.880 149.656
183.924 141.483
183.317 141.016
13.562 11.895
13.539 11.875
25.547 16.485
2.364
-0.230
L2M2 L4M10
1.250
1.312
76.332 69.409
50.701 44.387
50.534 44.241
7.120
6.662
7.109
6.651
5.954
4.314
0.787
0.495

Table C.3: Nose (Part 1)
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L2M0
0.250
124.034
342.935
341.803
18.519
18.488
8.160
-0.468
L3M2
0.625
64.142
41.807
41.669
6.466
6.455
3.226
0.252
L0M1
1.000
147.111
135.555
135.107
11.643
11.624
15.976
-0.249
L3M5
1.375
65.683
45.493
45.342
6.745
6.734
3.528
0.343

L4M2
0.312
96.466
178.279
177.691
13.352
13.330
6.591
-0.270
L4M5
0.687
67.684
41.698
41.560
6.457
6.447
2.215
0.523
L4M8
1.062
149.748
141.646
141.178
11.902
11.882
16.024
-0.243
L4M11
1.438
64.754
50.951
50.783
7.138
7.126
4.855
0.176

φ
r̄
σ2
s2
σ
s
G1
G2
φ
r̄
σ2
s2
σ
s
G1
G2

L1M1
1.500
66.556
64.171
63.959
8.011
7.997
7.324
0.101
L3M7
1.875
126.186
295.377
294.402
17.187
17.158
70.417
1.395

L4M12
L3M6 L4M13
L2M3 L4M14
1.562
1.625
1.688
1.750
1.812
72.185 81.025 98.158 124.238 154.890
77.470 104.104 183.115 345.204 156.668
77.214 103.760 182.511 344.065 156.151
8.802 10.203 13.532 18.580 12.517
8.787 10.186 13.510 18.549 12.496
8.060 10.076
8.311
8.911 12.752
0.132
0.169
-0.089
-0.448
0.689
L4M15
1.938
129.157
185.535
184.923
13.621
13.599
12.749
-0.038
Table C.4: Nose (Part 2)
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φ
r̄
σ2
s2
σ
s
G1
G2
φ
r̄
σ2
s2
σ
s
G1
G2
φ
r̄
σ2
s2
σ
s
G1
G2

L0M0
L3M0
L2M0
L3M1
0.000
0.125
0.250
0.375
49.658 53.040 65.374 89.027
98.440 105.798 129.264 150.549
98.115 105.449 128.837 150.052
9.922 10.286 11.369 12.270
9.905 10.269 11.351 12.250
12.260 10.487
4.294
4.416
1.121
1.226
1.251
0.458
L2M1
L3M3
L0M1
L3M4
0.750
0.875
1.000
1.125
63.934 49.390 40.010 49.517
130.734 133.791 102.266 137.580
130.303 133.349 101.929 137.126
11.434 11.567 10.113 11.729
11.415 11.548 10.096 11.710
4.641 16.654 15.086 13.309
1.542
1.180
1.031
0.835
L1M1
L3M6
L2M3
L3M7
1.500
1.625
1.750
1.875
112.634 87.333 65.006 52.759
120.417 146.153 132.131 103.085
120.019 145.670 131.695 102.744
10.973 12.089 11.495 10.153
10.955 12.069 11.476 10.136
5.428
3.690
6.423
8.854
0.244
0.659
0.813
0.943
Table C.5: Lips
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L1M0
0.500
112.360
124.541
124.130
11.160
11.141
3.213
0.099
L2M2
1.250
64.286
146.912
146.427
12.121
12.101
11.140
1.931

L3M2
0.625
83.977
134.963
134.517
11.617
11.598
27.498
1.806
L3M5
1.375
85.095
154.169
153.660
12.416
12.396
33.232
1.440

φ
r̄
σ2
s2
σ
s
G1
G2
φ
r̄
σ2
s2
σ
s
G1
G2
φ
r̄
σ2
s2
σ
s
G1
G2

L0M0
L3M0
L2M0
L3M1
0.000
0.125
0.250
0.375
466.272 434.035 391.517 345.527
1172.489 887.076 726.651 546.586
1168.620 884.148 724.252 544.782
34.242
29.784
26.956
23.379
34.185
29.735
26.912
23.341
44.087
38.608
74.903
29.173
0.165
0.277
1.477
-0.157
L2M1
L3M3
L0M1
L3M4
0.750
0.875
1.000
1.125
416.934 477.044 464.120 477.057
993.008 1409.828 1166.326 1359.851
989.731 1405.176 1162.476 1355.363
31.512
37.548
34.152
36.876
31.460
37.486
34.095
36.815
-17.748
57.674
33.357
53.308
-0.221
0.266
0.256
0.229
L1M1
L3M6
L2M3
L3M7
1.500
1.625
1.750
1.875
335.690 346.607 393.952 436.178
388.629 533.714 704.162 938.493
387.346 531.952 701.838 935.396
19.714
23.102
26.536
30.635
19.681
23.064
26.492
30.584
-2.088
28.493
78.017
50.431
-0.525
-0.163
1.407
0.374
Table C.6: Facial region
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L1M0
0.500
335.325
387.070
385.793
19.674
19.642
-2.790
-0.571
L2M2
1.250
416.434
958.403
955.240
30.958
30.907
-23.580
-0.225

L3M2
0.625
354.230
418.469
417.087
20.457
20.423
2.426
-0.284
L3M5
1.375
353.423
436.728
435.287
20.898
20.864
3.090
-0.235
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